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Abstract 
Cooperative peer-to-peer applications are designed to share the resources of participat-
ing computers for the common good of all users. However, users do not necessarily have 
an incentive to donate resources to the system if they can use the system's resources for 
free. As commonly observed in deployed applications, this situation adversely affects the 
applications' performance and sometimes even their availability and usability. 
While traditional resource management is handled by a centralized enforcement entity, 
adopting similar solution raises new concerns for distributed peer-to-peer systems. This 
dissertation proposes to solve the incentive problem in peer-to-^peer applications by design-
ing fair sharing policies and enforcing these policies in a distributed manner. The feasibility 
and practicability of this approach is demonstrated through numerous applications, namely 
archival storage systems, streaming systems, content distribution systems, and anonymous 
communication systems. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
To the general public, p2p may be a synonym for unauthorized distribution of copy-
righted music and movies. This unfortunate association is primarily due to the popularity 
of many file-sharing applications, such as the early versions of Napster, Kazaa [Kaz], and, 
more recently, BitTorrent [Coh03], that make use of peer-to-peer technology. Peer-to-peer 
technology is not limited to sharing files; in fact, it is merely a series of networked comput-
ers, comprising of individual users' computing resources, to run distributed applications. 
1.1 Peer-to-peer Systems 
Peer-to-peer, or more precisely peer-to-peer computer networking, is a paradigm for 
connecting computers in a decentralized fashion to build scalable systems. Unlike the 
more common client-server paradigm, in peer-to-peer networks the application service is 
not provided by dedicated servers. Instead, each participant, or peer, contributes some 
of their resources to collectively provide the service. Ideally, peer-to-peer systems can 
aggregate resources of all peers to provide service with very high levels of availability, 
reliability, scalability, and autonomy. With this promising upside, large number of co-
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operative peer-to-peer systems have been proposed and developed recently, providing a 
general-purpose network substrate [MM02, RDOla, RFH+01, SMK+01, ZHS+04] suit-
able for sharing files [DKK+01, DR01, MMGC02], storage space [CMN02, RDOlb], 
and bandwidth [BBK02, CDK+03, CDKR02, CRZ02], and for anonymous communica-
tion [DDM03, DMS04, FM02], among other applications. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Peer-to-peer applications are usually designed to work in open networks, where any 
computer can freely join and leave at any time. Early applications typically assumed that 
most users are cooperative and are willing to altruistically contribute resources to the net-
work. In practice, however, with the widespread of applications such as Napster, Gnutella, 
and Kazaa (see, e.g., Oram [OraOl] for an overview of these systems), it has been ob-
served that in peer-to-peer systems, many users choose to consume the resources of other 
users without providing any of their own resources in return. These self-interested users 
are often referred to as "free riders" or "freeloaders? The study on Gnutella by Adar and 
Huberman [AHOO] in 2000, for example, showed that upwards of 70% of the users enjoy 
the benefit of the system without contributing to its content, and nearly half of all service 
responses are performed by the top 1% of the users. Similar uncooperative behavior had 
been observed by Saroiu et al. [SGG02]. A later study in 2005 found freeloaders have 
further increased to 85% of all Gnutella users [HCW05]. This uneven service provision 
clearly shows that if non-cooperative behavior has no downside, most users will not con-
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tribute their resources, and only a very small fraction of potential resources would become 
available. User selfishness significantly limits the scalability and performance of the result-
ing systems. If insufficient number of users contribute, in the extreme, these systems may 
even fail to function properly. This conflict over resources between individual interests and 
the common good leads to a classic "tragedy of the commons" situation [Har68]. 
The inherent cause of this conflict is that users have no natural incentive to provide ser-
vices to their peers if it is not somehow required of them. Participants in peer-to-peer sys-
tems, after all, are human users with their own agendas. While some people may contribute 
because of the software's default settings, negligence, altruism, or other reasons, most peo-
ple join simply because they expect to benefit from these systems by receiving services. 
Instead of sharing, they may prefer to reserve their resources for their own consumption or 
they may worry about unfavorable consequence of sharing (e.g., legal consequence of shar-
ing copyrighted materials or monetary costs imposed by some Internet Service Providers 
when usage goes beyond certain bandwidth threshold). Therefore, to operate open peer-to-
peer systems to their full potential, system designers have to pay attention to ensuring fair 
sharing of resources. 
Resource management in distributed systems is not a new problem. Common solu-
tions are typically centralized, where some designated trusted authority would give a user 
"permission" to consume resources. For example, in a distributed file system of a campus 
network, an administrator may assign a disk usage quota to each user. However, such no-
tions are hard to create in a network of decentralized, ungoverned peers. Why should some 
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peers be placed in a position of authority over others? What if they abuse their authori-
tative power? Furthermore, how could the central authority ever scale to support millions 
of concurrent users, and provide services efficiently and reliably? Are there alternatives to 
this centralized design? 
1.3 Previous Approaches and Relevant Works 
Many approaches have been proposed to study and solve the incentive problem in dis-
tributed systems. This section serves as a brief survey of these approaches and other rel-
evant works. Further discussions and comparisons to the mechanisms proposed in this 
dissertation can be found in Chapter 7. 
1.3.1 Discourage abuse of service 
Resource consumption in peer-to-peer systems are typically "free" (i.e., gratis) in the 
sense that users do not have to pay for any service they receive, even though the service 
itself has value. To discourage abuse, one can associate a cost with the service. Dwork and 
Naor [DN92] suggested to require users to compute a moderately hard, but not intractable, 
function in order to gain access to the resource. It has been implemented as a counter-
measure for spam and denial-of-service attacks [Bac02]. Abadi et al., noting the sharp 
disparities in computational power across computer systems, proposed the use of memory-
bound functions instead [ABMW05]. 
While these methods may be successful in limiting the service received by freeloaders, 
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it is a complete waste of resources — these mathematical puzzles only serve as a deterrence 
to use of service and solving them do not directly benefit anyone. 
1.3.2 Tit-for-tat 
A straightforward way to ensure fairness is to resort to barter economy, where two 
or more parties simultaneously exchange service with each other. Tangier [WM01], a 
censorship-resistant publication system, maintains fairness by requiring new servers to 
provide storage space for a period of time before they are allowed to publish. For file-
sharing, BitTorrent [Coh03] allows peers to exchange pieces of a large object that everyone 
wants, but would "choke" (i.e., stop uploading to) peers that do not return the favor, effec-
tively encouraging peers to exchange uploading slots. In spite of this design intent, Piatek 
et al. [PIA+07] showed that all BitTorrent nodes contribute resources that do not directly 
improve their performance, and selfish peers can significantly reduce their contribution and 
yet improve their download performance. Samsara [CN03] considered peer-to-peer storage 
systems and proposed equal exchange of storage space between peers. 
The downside of tit-for-tat is that it only works when two peers are interested in the 
resource possessed by each other at the same time. The difficulty in finding exchange part-
ners increases with network size and the likelihood decreases as the varieties of resource 
increase. 
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1.3.3 Electronic currency 
A natural improvement to baiter economy is to leverage some form of electronic cur-
rency as a medium of exchange. A number of micropayment schemes have been pro-
posed to support lightweight transactions over the Internet (see Wayner [Way97] for a 
survey). These schemes can be applied to peer-to-peer systems for peers to exchange for 
services [Moj]. In particular, efforts have been spent on building such notion in peer-to-peer 
systems [VCS03] and anonymous communication networks [RWW05]. SHARP [FCC+03] 
is a framework for distributed resource management, where each user can issue its own cur-
rency, known as claims, and trade resources like bandwidth with trusted peers. 
Trading and payments architectures may be too expensive for many peer-to-peer dis-
tribution systems, as each operation would incur cryptographic operations and additional 
communication. Moreover, implementing micropayments either requires a centralized au-
thority to issue currencies, or uses distributed trust and currency, which still remains as 
largely unresolved. 
1.3.4 Reputation 
An alternative to payments is to keep track of each user's past behavior, either ev-
erything they have done before (reputation) or only when they deviate from acceptable 
behavior (accountability). Dingledine et al. [DFM01] surveyed many schemes for tracking 
nodes' reputations. In particular, if obtaining a new identity is cheap and positive rep-
utations have value, negative reputation could be shed easily by leaving the system and 
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rejoining with a new identity. 
There have been several proposals on building a centralized reputation system for peer-
to-peer applications [AD01, DDPS03, GJA03, NT04]. Furthermore, Blanc et al. [BLV05] 
considered applying a reputation system to the more fundamental peer-to-peer routing in-
centive problem. An important example of a somewhat successful reputation management 
is the online auction system eBay [eba], where buyers can rate sellers after each transaction, 
and eBay acts as the centralized system to store and manage these ratings. 
While the aforementioned reputation systems require a centralize trusted authority, 
EigenTrust [KSGM03] computes reputation in a fully distributed and secure fashion. In 
EigenTrust, the global reputation of each peer is given by the local trust values assigned to 
that peer by other peers, weighted by the global reputations of the assigning peers. The se-
curity and scalability of the reputation system is achieved by disallowing a peer to compute 
its own trust value and computing each trust value by more than one peer. 
A potential threat for all reputation systems, including EigenTrust, is that colluding 
peers that are otherwise cooperative can boost up the reputation of each other, giving them 
an unfair advantage over other peers. 
1.3.5 Byzantine faults 
A common way to abstract computers' failure to follow prescribed behavior is to em-
ploy a Byzantine failure model [LSP82]. This model encompasses any arbitrary fault that 
occurs in a distributed system. In general, mechanisms to prevent or mitigate malicious be-
havior, such as Byzantine quorums [MR97] and Byzantine state machines [CL99], may be 
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employed as defensive measures. Castro et al. [CDG+02] described techniques that make 
peer-to-peer substrates robust to collusions of a minority of malicious nodes in the overlay 
who attempt to compromise the overlay. These measures are typically very expensive and 
feasible only under the assumption that most nodes will behave correctly. 
More recently, Aiyer et al. [AAC+05] introduced the BAR (Byzantine, Altruistic, and 
Rational) model as a foundation for reasoning about cooperative services. Under this 
model, they defined a replicated state machine protocol that can tolerate both Byzan-
tine users and an unbounded number of rational users, and demonstrated the architecture 
through a cooperative backup service. Li et al. [LCW+06] combined the BAR replica-
tion protocol with the Gossip algorithm [DGH+88] to create a peer-to-peer data streaming 
application. 
PeerReview [HKD07] is a system to provide accountability in distributed systems. It 
works by maintaining a secure record of messages sent and received by each node. These 
records are then used to automatically detect when a node's behavior deviates from that of a 
given reference implementation. This ensures that Byzantine faults are eventually detected, 
and a correct node can defend itself against false accusations. 
These general primitives are alternate approaches to deal with freeloading in peer-to-
peer systems. A comparison of these approaches against the methods used in this disserta-
tion can be found in Chapter 7. 
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1.3.6 Game theory 
Game theory is a field to use mathematics to capture behavior in strategic situations, 
in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others. It is 
suitable for analyzing peer-to-peer systems, where individual users interact with each other 
in a selfish fashion, and there are often no central authorities to oversee and govern activities 
of each user. Axelrod [Axe81] investigated the necessary and sufficient conditions under 
which cooperation will emerge in these situations. A more recent overview of the entire 
field can be found in Young [You98]. These studies explain why ungoverned peer-to-peer 
systems can function at all, and what properties are necessary for these systems to function 
well and be collectively stable. 
1.3.7 Mechanism design 
A closely related field to designing incentives into peer-to-peer systems in economics 
is mechanism design. Mechanism design is concern with the design of rules of games that 
involves multiple self-interested agents to achieve a specific system-wide outcome (see 
Mas-Colell et al. [MCWG95] or Varian [Var92] for references). Nevertheless, mechanism 
design may be considered "hyper-rational" for human behavior. It may be a more ap-
propriate model for computers (software agents), as software agents generally have better 
computational powers than human beings [Var95]. 
Nisan and Ronen's seminal work on algorithmic mechanism design combined theoret-
ical computer science's traditional focus on computation tractability with incentive com-
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patibility in economics [NR01]. Feigenbaum et al. further extended the model to a set-
ting where relevant information and computation are all inherently distributed [AFK+04, 
FKSS03, FPS01]. 
Mechanisms design guarantees incentive-compatibility, but they usually demand coor-
dination efforts from some central authorities to collect users' preferences and to define 
policies. Moreover, all the aforementioned works require electronic currency to facilitate 
payment between peers. These requirements make them impractical for many peer-to-peer 
systems. 
1.3.8 Economic analysis 
There are also many economic studies and analyses that provide insights to the art 
and science of designing peer-to-peer systems. Friedman and Resnick [FR01] noted that 
the Internet allows one to easily erase his reputation by changing his name. This creates 
a situation where positive reputations are valuable, but negative reputations do not stick. 
Their study concluded that this model does not sustain complete cooperation, and a natural 
convention is to distrust or even mistreat strangers until they establish positive reputations. 
For resource-sharing peer-to-peer applications, it is therefore necessary for peers to limit 
the resources available to newcomers, even at a cost to the system as a whole. 
Fuqua et al. [FNW03] considered a game-theoretic model to study the economic behav-
ior of peer-to-peer storage networks. Their study showed how to model users' utility in a 
peer-to-peer system. This provides insights to system administrators on how system param-
eters can be chosen by soliciting votes from users, and how users with similar preferences 
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might cluster into multiple systems. 
Fehr and Gachter's study considered an economic game where selfishness was feasible 
but could easily be detected [FG02]. When their human test subjects were given the oppor-
tunity to spend their money to punish selfish peers, they did so, resulting in a system with 
less selfish behaviors. This result justifies that users will be willing to pay some costs to 
ensure fairness. 
1.4 Contribution of this Thesis 
This thesis is concerned with solving the incentives problem in peer-to-peer systems. 
By studying the incentives of the users, resource management and policy enforcement can 
be designed directly into peer-to-peer systems. More specifically, instead of leaving re-
source contribution as a user option and relying on users' goodwill and altruism, it should 
be made as a necessary condition for one to receive good services from the systems. To this 
end, if good services are only provided to cooperative peers, freeloaders would find their 
quality of service drops sufficiently that they may prefer to either leave the system for good 
or start contributing resources back. 
A distributed resource enforcement scheme is usually preferred even when a central-
ized solution is feasible. By incorporating incentive into the design, it removes reliance of 
a centralized authority for systems to function correctly, therefore improving their avail-
ability and scalability. 
To provide incentives to promote cooperations in peer-to-peer system, one has to first 
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understand user incentives, which vary greatly for different applications. For instance, in 
an archival storage systems, users want to have reliable long term storage space; whereas 
in content distribution systems, users want to retrieve contents quickly. In this thesis, I 
propose to solve the incentives problem in peer-to-peer applications by: 
1. Identifying the incentives of users; 
2. Defining a fair sharing policy; and 
3. Designing a mechanism to enforce the policy in a (mostly) distributed manner. 
My thesis research is focused on applying this approach to different applications. The 
major contributions of this thesis include the followings. 
• Define selfishness as a separate attack model in peer-to-peer systems and compare it 
against the traditional adversarial model. 
• Propose a general approach to solve the incentive problem in peer-to-peer systems. 
• Using the proposed approach, show how the incentive problem can be addressed in 
peer-to-peer archival storage systems, streaming systems, content distribution sys-
tems, and anonymous communication systems. 
• Discuss general conditions for incentive schemes to work in peer-to-peer systems. 
• Generalize several common design principles for large-scale peer-to-peer systems. 
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1.5 Guide to the Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 provides the background, advantages, and taxonomy of peer-to-peer systems. 
It discusses the assumptions and the model of peer-to-peer systems that this thesis is fo-
cused on. 
Chapter 3 describes the incentive scheme for the first application, peer-to-peer archival 
storage systems, which allows participants to exchange disk space to store their backup 
data. It proposes a novel policy enforcement scheme by allowing peers to probabilistically 
audit each other. 
Chapter 4 considers the applications of peer-to-peer streaming systems, which utilize 
the collective bandwidth of users to forward multimedia streams to each other. To ensure 
fairness, the streaming network layout changes over time and peers can monitor each oth-
ers' contributions to the system to decide whether to provide services to them. 
The third application, peer-to-peer content distribution systems, is discussed in Chap-
ter 5. In those systems, users can download objects of their interest from other computers 
possessing the objects. The problem is solved by tracking "debts" between peers and pro-
viding a scheme for leveraging debts to retrieve objects. 
Peer-to-peer anonymous communication systems are the last application considered. 
Chapter 6 presents an incentive scheme for systems that help users to communicate anony-
mously on the Internet. Fairness is enforced by relying on some trusted authorities to 
measure the level of contribution of each peer and to decide the level of service it can 
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receive. 
Chapter 7 summarizes the techniques used to introduce incentives for different applica-
tions. It also discusses the conditions for these incentive schemes to work and when they 
should be used. Finally, Chapter 8 discusses future work and concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
Background and Model 
This chapter gives an overview of peer-to-peer systems and provides the definitions of 
some of the terminologies used throughout this thesis. It also discusses security problems 
in peer-to-peer systems and defines the threat model. 
2.1 Peer-to-peer Networks 
In a peer-to-peer network, all computer nodes have identical or similar roles. Each 
node may be a service provider (server) as well as a service consumer (client). Unlike the 
more common client-server paradigm, there is usually no dedicated server to provide ser-
vices; instead, the functionality of providing services is distributed among all participating 
computers. Peer-to-peer networks are usually self-organizing and do not need much ad-
ministrative setup or maintenance. Most peer-to-peer networks are also overlay networks, 
where connections between nodes are built on top of an existing network, typically the 
Internet. 
In the purest form, a peer-to-peer network should be completely decentralized and ev-
ery single node in the network should share the exact same responsibilities. However, 
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many peer-to-peer networks rely on some kind of centralized components to provide lim-
ited functionality, such as to provide a point of entry or to assign a unique identifier number 
to a joining node. Some systems also allow nodes to serve different roles according to their 
level of trust and resources. For example, some utilize the concept of supernodes, where a 
small subset of more stable, resource-rich nodes provides routing and discovery services to 
the rest of the network. 
Decentralized system design has been around for decades. Early examples include 
Usenet news server, email transmission protocol (SMTP), and Internet Relay Chat (IRC). 
However, most more recent applications followed the client-server paradigm because of 
the simplicity of its design. This remained until recent years, when the enormous growth 
of the Internet called for more scalable system designs and better utilization of otherwise 
unused resources at end points. 
2.1.1 Unstructured and structured networks 
A peer-to-peer network can either be structured or unstructured. In an unstructured 
peer-to-peer network, there is no specific rules to govern the connections between nodes; 
each node has the complete freedom of choosing its neighbors. As a consequent, nodes 
tend to choose other nodes that are in close proximity or share the same interest, if not 
entirely randomly. 
A major drawback for unstructured peer-to-peer networks is the lack of guarantee in 
efficiency and scalability. For instance, searching is usually inefficient. Since there is 
no central directory, a node could appear in any part of the network. Without flooding the 
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entire network, there is no guarantee in locating a particular node or resource. This problem 
can be solved by exerting a graph structure in the network. Generally, in a structured peer-
to-peer network, each node has a unique identifier from a large numeric space, referred 
to as a nodeld. A node selects its neighbors from the set of nodes whose nodeld satisfy 
certain constraints relative to its own nodeld. The constraints differ for different neighbor 
set slots and some are more restrictive than others. With this constraint in place, a search 
for a particular node can be done by progressively moving closer to that node in the nodeld 
space. This guarantees that, under normal network conditions, any node can be reached 
from anywhere in the network within a maximum route length, usually logarithmic to the 
network size. 
2.1.2 Distributed hash table (DHT) 
One common functionality provided by structured peer-to-peer networks is as a dis-
tributed hash table (DHT). Similar to a traditional hash table, a DHT provides lookup 
services from a key (or name or identifier) to a value (a resource or a resource location). 
However, the responsibility for the maintenance of the association between keys and values 
is distributed among the nodes in the network. This is usually done through a key-based 
routing service [DZD+03], where given a key, a request will be routed to the node that is 
responsible for that key. Similar to searching for a node, any object in the network can be 
found with a number of network hops logarithmic to the size of the network. 
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2.1.3 Advantages 
Since the peer-to-peer paradigm does not require any centralized component, it has 
many advantages over the client-server paradigm. First, it is more available and reliable, 
since the system can still function when part of the network has failed or is under mainte-
nance. Second, while demands for services grow with the network size, so will the aggre-
gated resources provided by the new peers, making peer-to-peer networks fundamentally 
scalable. Peer-to-peer networks are also autonomous, as the lack of centralized component 
means that there is no need for dedicated management and maintenance of the network. 
2.1.4 An example: Pastry 
There are many different structured peer-to-peer networks proposed in recent years, in-
cluding CAN [RFH+01], Chord [SMK+01], Kademlia [MM02], and Tapestry [ZHS+04]. 
While the designs in this thesis are mostly independent of the peer-to-peer substrate, Pastry 
is discussed here as a reference. 
Pastry [RDOla] is a structured peer-to-peer overlay network that provides a key-based 
routing service. Each Pastry node has a unique, 128-bit nodeld. Given a message and a key, 
Pastry can normally route the message to the live node whose nodeld is numerically closest 
to the key in less than [log2t N] hops, where N is the number of nodes in the network and 
b is a configuration parameter with a typical value of 4. A Pastry node's routing table is 
organized into [log2* Af| rows with 2b — 1 entries in each row. The y'th entry in row i refers 
to a node whose nodeld shares the first i digits with the current node but with its i+ 1th 
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digit being j . An entry may not be defined if no node with suitable nodeld is known. This 
definition of a routing table enables prefix routing, where each routing hop can usually 
match at least one more digit in nodeld. 
In addition to a routing table, each Pastry node also maintains a leaf set, which is defined 
as the Q./2 nodes with numerically closest nodelds in each direction in nodeld space. The 
value of I is usually 16. The inclusion of the leaf set improves the connectivity of the 
network under high churn rate. 
FreePastry [Fre] is an open source implementation of Pastry in Java. It provides the 
peer-to-peer substrate Pastry and several applications built on top, including anycast primi-
tive in Scribe [CDKR02], archival storage utility in PAST [RDOlb], and content streaming 
and distribution system in SplitStream [CDK+03]. FreePastry is used in some of the simu-
lations in this thesis. 
2.2 Attacks and Threat Model 
This section discusses attacks in peer-to-peer systems and the threat model considered 
in this thesis. 
2.2.1 Malicious attacks 
Malicious attacks are defined as any deviation from the prescribed behavior by an adver-
sary with malicious intent. The objective of the adversary may include obtaining unautho-
rized access to content, corrupting or censoring content, or denying or degrading services 
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to other users. 
Sybil attacks 
An inherent weakness of open peer-to-peer networks is the lack of central identity man-
agement. When a new node joins a network, it needs to create an identity. While each 
identity in the network corresponds to a unique node, and thus a user, a user may join the 
network under multiple identities. Enforcing a one-to-one mapping between nodes and 
identities is made difficult by the distributed nature and openness of many peer-to-peer sys-
tems. In fact, one simple attack on an open peer-to-peer network is to join the network, 
using the same node or a handful of nodes, many times under different identities. This is 
known as the Sybil attack [Dou02]. Once controlling a sufficiently large fraction of the 
network, the adversary would be able to eavesdrop traffic and censor messages. It could 
also cut off nodes from the network if they are only connected to nodes controlled by the 
adversary. Worse, if the peer-to-peer network relies on consensus, these results could easily 
be manipulated by the adversary. 
Several suggestions have been made on defending or limiting the effects of Sybil attack, 
including "hashcash" [Bac02], bounding number of neighbors of each node [SNDW06], 
and relying on social networks [DLLKA05, MPDG08, YKGF06, YGKX08]. Cheng and 
Friedman [CF05] proposed a framework for assessing a reputation mechanism's robustness 
to Sybil attacks. However, to date, the only known robust method is to require some form 
of a centralized authority to assign identities and maintain a public key infrastructure (PKI). 
Under this infrastructure, any user would have a fixed identifier to be used in only one node. 
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Because the centralized authority's sole purpose is to assign identifiers, it is not involved 
in regular peer-to-peer transactions. This reduces the cost to implement the centralized 
authority, as it needs not provide highly available, scalable, or redundant service. 
As a side benefit, a PKI also gives each node in the network the capability of digital 
signature. Any node can digitally sign any data such that any other node can verify the 
origin, yet it is computationally infeasible for other nodes to forge. This allows nodes to 
freely contact and negotiate with their peers without worrying about the authenticity and 
integrity of the communication. 
Other malicious attacks 
Traditional threat models for distributed systems usually assume an adversary that can 
take over at most a small fraction of the servers. Even if a solution for the Sybil attack is 
assumed, there are still numerous attacks the adversary can mount on the network. 
At the lowest level, an adversary may deviate from the prescribed protocol, say by 
not forwarding messages. Most peer-to-peer systems are already engineered to be robust 
against traffic loss due to network failures. In the extreme case of a node refusing to prop-
erly forward low-level traffic, that nodes' neighbors could flag the node as unresponsive 
and would likely remove the node from the network. Regardless, these types of deviation 
from prescribed behavior can be classified as Byzantine faults and can be handled as such, 
as discussed in Section 1.3.5. 
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2.2.2 Freeloading "attacks" 
While traditional threat model assumes an adversary may attack the system in any arbi-
trary way, even if the attack is costly to the adversary, the predominant form of misbehavior 
observed in peer-to-peer systems is freeloading. 
In a sense, freeloaders more closely resemble economically "rational" agents who will 
behave correctly, but only if good behavior maximizes their "utility" from the peer-to-peer 
network. While any deviation from correct or desirable behavior can be treated as a secu-
rity attack and handled accordingly, freeloading in peer-to-peer systems raises a somewhat 
non-traditional security model. Users of peer-to-peer systems are not motivated to attack 
the system; they only care about maximizing their own welfare. For instance, in a file-
sharing system, if uploading files to peers has no effect on a user's download rate, the user 
may choose to not upload. However, users have no incentive to upload incorrect data or 
otherwise try to damage other nodes in the network. 
Moreover, freeloading is relatively easy. In Kazaa, for example, a client configured 
to have minimum upload bandwidth suffices to freeload. Similar settings also exist in 
many variations of BitTorrent. This is unlike a malicious attack, which would require 
considerable technical expertise. Thus, the fraction of users who have the motivation and 
ability to freeload is likely to far exceed those that are intent and able to mount a malicious 
attack. 
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2.2.3 Threat model 
Since malicious attackers and freeloaders have completely different intent and behavior, 
the two threats call for different mechanisms. A defense against malicious behavior can, 
and often must, assume that malicious behavior is limited to a minority of users. A defense 
against freeloading must be effective and efficient even when a large fraction of participants 
attempt to freeload. These defenses should be complementary to each other and should be 
used in conjunction. As a result, the adversarial model in this thesis is limited to simple 
freeloading behavior on the application layer, where the only objective of the adversary is 
to obtain services without contributing a reasonable amount of its resources to the system. 
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Chapter 3 
Archival Storage Systems 
3.1 Introduction 
The first application to consider is peer-to-peer archival storage systems. In these sys-
tems, users store their data remotely on other peers but rarely retrieve their data. Thus, 
storage space (i.e., free disk space) becomes the limited commodity. An example of a sys-
tem like this is a remote backup service, where only the writer of a given data block might 
want to read it. The data may go unread until the writer suffers some kind of catastrophic 
equipment failure, which could be relatively rare in modern systems. A simple fair policy 
is to require each node to provide at least the same amount of storage space it uses from 
the system. 
Design objective: The amount of storage space a user consumes from the net-
work should not exceed the amount of space it is providing back. 
Note that the ability to consume resources, such as remote disk storage, is a form of 
commodity, as remote resources have different values to a user than its local storage. When 
users exchange their local storage for others' remote storage, the trade could benefit both 
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parties, giving an incentive for them to cooperate. As such, there is no need for cash or 
other forms of real-world money to exchange hands; the economy can be expressed strictly 
in terms of single-good baiter schemes in storage. 
This chapter is based on a paper published in the Second International Workshop on 
Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS) [NWD03]. This was a joint work with Dan S. Wallach and 
Peter Druschel. 
3.2 Ensuring Honest Storage 
For any untrusted network storage system, it is imperative to ensure the remote nodes 
are honestly storing the files they are claiming credit for. This is guaranteed by the follow-
ing challenge mechanism. 
For each file a node, say Alice, is storing in the network, she periodically picks a node, 
say Bob, that stores a replica of the same file as a target. Alice notifies all other replicas 
holders of the file that she is challenging Bob. Then she randomly selects a few blocks 
of the file and a random key, and queries Bob for a keyed hash of those blocks. Bob can 
answer correctly only if he has the file. Bob may ask another replica holder for a copy of 
the file, but any such request during a challenge would cause Alice to be notified, and thus 
restarts the challenge for another file. 
A potential problem is that colluding nodes storing replicas of the same file could just 
store one copy instead of two, however this would be unlikely to occur. The nodes respon-
sible for replicating a given file are typically constrained; in PAST [DR01], for example, 
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they are the set of adjacent nodes with nodelds closest to the object handle. With random 
nodeld assignment, few colluders would be adjacent to each other in nodeld space. 
3.3 Design 
Instead of directly enforcing quota or employing any capability in the system, this de-
sign requires nodes to maintain their own records and publish them, so that other nodes 
can audit those records. Of course, nodes have no inherent reason to publish their records 
accurately. This section describes how to create natural economic disincentives to nodes 
lying in their records. 
3.3.1 Usage files 
Every node maintains a usage file, digitally signed, which is available for any other 
node to read. The usage file has three sections: 
• the advertised capacity this node is providing to the system; 
• a local list of tuples (file handle, file size, nodeld), containing information of all files 
that the node is storing locally on behalf of other nodes; and 
• a remote list of handles of all the files published by this node (stored remotely), with 
their sizes. 
Together, the local and remote lists describe all the credits and debits to a node's ac-
count. Note that the nodelds for the peers storing the files are not stored in the remote list, 
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Local: (C,F3),(A,F4) 
Remote: F\,F4 ^,—<^-vN^D 
Local: (A,F\) Local: (B,F2) 
Remote: Fi Remote: F3 
Figure 3.1: A peer-to-peer system with nodes showing their local and remote lists. For simplicity, 
the size of the files are not shown. 
since this information can be found using mechanisms in the storage system (e.g., PAST). 
A node is said to be "under quota," and thus allowed to write new files into the system, 
when its advertised capacity minus the sum of the files in its remote list multiplied with 
the number of replications, is positive. Since the entries in local/remote lists have to be 
matched, all usage files have to be balanced. By increasing the advertised capacity, a node 
can store more files on the system, but it also has to make an equal amount of space avail-
able. By adding matched pairs in the local list of one node and the remote list of another, 
the credit is transferred from the latter node to the former. 
When a node A wishes to store a file F\ on another node B, B must first fetch A's usage 
file to verify that A is under quota. Then, two records are created: A adds F\ to its remote 
list and B adds (A,F\) to its local list. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Of course, A might 
fabricate the contents of its usage file to convince B to improperly accept its files. 
3.3.2 Attacks and audits 
It is necessary to provide incentives for A to tell the truth. To game the system, A might 
normally attempt to either inflate its advertised capacity or deflate the sum of its remote 
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list. If A were to increase its advertised capacity beyond the amount of disk it actually has, 
this might allow A to consume more space than it is actually providing when the system 
is significantly under capacity. This is not the probable case, since providing additional 
space creates additional bandwidth overhead in storing files and challenges. Moreover, if 
the system is underutilized, nodes consuming unfair amount of space is not a serious issue. 
When the utilization becomes high, A will attract storage requests that it cannot honor. 
A might compensate by creating fraudulent entries in its local list claiming the storage is 
used. To prevent fraudulent entries in either list, there is an auditing procedure that B, or 
any other node, may perform on A. 
If B detects that F\ is missing from A's remote list, then B can feel free to delete the file.1 
After all, A is no longer "paying" for it. Since it would be possible for A to provide a tailored 
version of the usage file if it knew the identity of its auditor, anonymous communication 
is required, which can be accomplished using intermediate nodes to relay the request, a 
technique similar to Crowds [RR98]. As long as every node that has a relationship with A 
is auditing it at randomly chosen intervals, A cannot distinguish whether it is being audited 
by B or any other node with files in its remote list. This process is referred to as a normal 
audit. 
Random audits. Normal auditing — alone — does not provide a disincentive to inflation 
of the local list. For every entry in A's local list, there should exist an entry for that file in 
another node's remote list. An auditor could fetch the usage file from A and then connect 
'in practice, B should give A a grace period as A might be facing a transient failure and actually need the 
backup. 
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Capacity: 1 
Capacity: 0 Local: (C,F3) 
Remote: F] /""'e~^-v0£' 
A 
Capacity: 1 Capacity: 1 
Local: {A,Ffi Local: {B,F2) 
Remote: F2 Remote: F3 
Figure 3.2: A cheating chain, where node A is the cheating anchor with unbalanced usage file but 
pushed its debt along the chain to node D. 
to every node mentioned in A's local list to test for matching entries. This would detect 
inconsistencies in A's usage file, but A could collude with other nodes to push its debts off 
its own books. To fully audit A, the auditor would need to audit the nodes reachable from 
A's local list, and recursively audit the nodes reachable from those local lists. Eventually, 
the audit would discover a cheating anchor where the books did not balance (see node D 
in Figure 3.2). Implementing such a recursive audit would be prohibitively expensive. 
Alternatively, all nodes in the peer-to-peer overlay are required to perform random auditing. 
With a perhaps lower frequency than their normal audits, each node should choose a node 
at random from the peer-to-peer overlay. The auditor fetches the usage file, and verifies 
it against the nodes mentioned in that file's local list. Assuming all nodes perform these 
random audits on a regular schedule, every node will be audited, on a regular basis, with 
high probability. 
To see how frequently each node would be audited, consider a system with N nodes, 
where c<Af nodes are conspiring. Assume the c conspiring nodes build a cheating chain, 
where there is only one cheating anchor. The probability that the cheating anchor is not 
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random audited by any non-conspiring node in one period is 
which approaches to \/e « 0.368 for large N. In other words, the cheating anchor would 
be discovered in three periods with probability over 95%. 
Recall that usage files are digitally signed by their nodes. Once a cheating anchor 
has been discovered, its usage file is effectively a signed confession of its misbehavior. 
This confession can be presented as evidence toward ejecting the cheater from the peer-
to-peer system. Unlike reputation systems, the proof is non-repudiable, regardless of the 
credibility of the auditor. With the cheating anchor ejected, other cheaters who depended 
on the cheating anchor will now be exposed and subject to ejection, themselves. This would 
not affect non-conspiring nodes, however, as they can simply delete the involved files and 
make the space available for other storage requests. 
Note that this design is robust even against bribery attacks, because the collusion will 
still be discovered and the cheaters ejected. Also note that since everybody, including the 
auditors, benefits when cheaters are discovered and ejected from the peer-to-peer system, 
nodes do have an incentive to perform these random audits [FG02]. 
3.3.3 Cheating patterns 
While cheating chains can be easily discovered and ejected from the system, a possible 
attack is for the cheating node to push back its debt to another node which, when audited, 
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will push back its debt to another node, eventually forming a cycle instead of a chain. This 
might be attempted either with or without increasing the advertised capacity. The following 
considers both cases. 
Without increasing the advertised capacity, a cheating node can only balance its usage 
file by removing some entries from its remote list. By forcing nodes to maintain logs of 
changes made to their usage files and marking each update with the (logical) timestamps 
of all involved parties [Lam78], the cheating anchor would be forced to give a total order 
on all its changes. If a node claims to remove an entry from its remote list after it has 
exceeded its quota, its log would be a signed confession that it has cheated. Otherwise, it 
has to withdraw a file from the system before storing new files. This eliminates any benefit 
the node might get, for itself, by participating in a cheating chain. 
By increasing its advertised capacity without bound, a node might be able to gain ad-
ditional storage credit in the system, hoping to take advantage of the system operating far 
below its actual capacity. While a freeloading agent might temporarily benefit from abus-
ing other nodes' excess capacity, these freeloaders will be discovered and ejected as the 
system's free space decreases and they eventually cannot support the local storage demand 
of them. Thus, when legitimate nodes need space, freeloaders will be naturally pushed out 
of the way. 
If the system is operating at or near its capacity, then any report of increased capacity 
on one node will immediately attract more files to be stored on that node. A node might try 
to simultaneously increase its published capacity and its list of locally stored files, claiming 
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to be full; the nodes responsible for replicating these objects will notice the discrepancy. 
3.3.4 Expelling a misbehaving node 
Once a node is discovered cheating, it needs to be ejected from the network. Note that 
there is already a signed confession of misbehavior, for which any node in the network can 
verify. Therefore, the ejection can be done by presenting this evidence to the node's current 
neighbors (in Pastry, for example, this means its leaf set and nodes with nodelds that are 
best fit for its routing table). 
The node that discovered the misbehavior would also have obtained the usage file of the 
offender during the process. Since the offender's files are likely included in the remote list 
of the usage file, nodes storing those files can be notified and have the files removed from 
the network. For those files that are not in the remote list, they would not survive through 
the next normal audit done by the storer anyway. 
To prevent ejected nodes from rejoining the network, these evidence should be made 
available for any node to query before they agree to provide storage space. This can be 
achieved by creating a special evidence file for each expelled node and have these files also 
stored in the network. The handle of these files can be a hash of the nodeld of the expelled 
nodes, so that it is trivial to query for such evidence, if existed. 
3.3.5 Preventing content distribution abuse 
We have assumed that these storage systems are strictly for backup data. However, it 
is conceivable that users may abuse the service for content distribution, in which case the 
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network bandwidth becomes the limited resources. This type of abuse can be prevented 
by setting a limit on the number of times each file can be retrieved over a period of time 
and requiring file owners to digitally sign a receipt for each retrieval. These receipts can 
be stored in a similar fashion to the evidence files and can become grounds for expelling a 
node from the network if the retrieval limit is exceeded. 
3.3.6 Handling churn 
Nodes leaving and rejoining is an unavoidable part of peer-to-peer networks, since these 
nodes are often not dedicated servers and are not maintained as such. However, a storage 
network needs to have high stability and availability, and any churn could be very costly 
since it could trigger relocation of files in the network. The hard question is whether file 
replications should be delayed in the hopes that a failed node will come back alive later on. 
A rule of thumb is that nodes with transient failures should not be removed from the 
network, but nodes with poor availability should be expelled. Consequently, there should 
be a minimum level of availability that each node agrees to provide. Neighboring nodes 
(e.g., those in the leaf set in Pastry) could monitor the availability of each other, and only 
when a node is unable to sustain mis level of availability should its neighboring nodes 
arrive to a consensus and expel that node from the network. 
3.3.7 Extensions 
Selling overcapacity. Using this mechanism, a node cannot consume more resources 
from the system than it provides itself. However, it is easy to imagine nodes who want 
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to consume more resources than they provide, and, likewise, nodes who provide more 
resources than they wish to consume. Naturally, this overcapacity could be sold, perhaps 
through an online bidding system [CGM02a], for real-world money. These trades could be 
directly indicated in the local and remote lists. For example, if D sells 1GB to E, D can 
write (E, 1GB trade) in its remote list, and E writes (D, 1GB trade) in its local list. All the 
auditing mechanisms continue to function. 
Reducing communication. Another issue is that fetching usage logs repeatedly could re-
sult in serious communication overhead, particularly for nodes with slow network connec-
tions. Three optimizations can be used to reduce this overhead. First, rather than sending 
the usage logs through the overlay route used to reach it, they can be sent directly over the 
Internet: one hop from the target node to the anonymizing relay, and one hop to the audit-
ing node. Second, since an entry in a remote list would be audited by all nodes replicating 
the logs, those replicas can alternately audit that node to share the cost of auditing. Third, 
communication can be further reduced by only transmitting the differences between usage 
logs, since the logs change slowly. Note that this must be done carefully to ensure that the 
anonymity of auditors is not compromised. For instance, a node could provide different 
sets of version numbers to different auditors to try to relate the sources between audits. To 
address this, the auditor needs to, from time to time, request the complete usage logs. 
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Figure 3.3: Overhead with different number of nodes. The overhead remains at the same level with 
increasing number of nodes, and auditing with caching costs similar to quota managers. 
3.4 Experiments 
We implemented a simulator to measure the communication cost of the design. The 
cost is compared against the following quota manager approach: Each node have a set 
of other nodes denoted as its manager set. Each manager must remember the amount of 
storage consumed by the nodes it manages and must endorse all requests from the managed 
nodes to store new files. To be robust against minority collusion, a remote node would insist 
that a majority of the manager nodes agree that a given request is authorized, requiring the 
manager set to perform a Byzantine agreement protocol [CL99]. 
Figure 3.3 shows the average upstream bandwidth required per node, as a function of 
the number of nodes (the average required downstream bandwidth is identical). The per-
node bandwidth requirement is almost constant, thus all systems scale well with the size of 
the overlay network. Moreover, with proper caching, the cost for auditing can remain low 
and be comparable to the quota manager approach. 
35 
CO 
Xi 
**—s 
•fi 
•a 
•a 
s 
CQ 
200 
180 
160 
140 
I/O 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
1 1 
Without caching 
With caching —-*—-
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 
Average number of files stored per node 
Figure 3.4: Overhead with different number of files stored per node. The overhead grows linearly 
with the number of files stored per node. 
CU 
•S 
'$ 
T3 
QQ 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
ix. 
-x.. 
-x--, 
•S B 
_, Q 
Without caching — B -
With caching —-*-
0 5 10 15 20 25 
Average node lifetime (days) 
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with increasing number of nodes, and auditing with caching costs similar to quota managers. 
Figure 3.4 shows the bandwidth requirement as a function of the number of files stored 
per node. The overheads grow linearly with the number of files, but for auditing without 
caching, it grows nearly twice as fast as auditing with caching. If the system is used for 
large files, such as might be expected for backup systems, this overhead would be incon-
sequential. Nodes can also be incentivized to store a smaller number of larger files by 
defining a system-wide minimum file size. 
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Figure 3.5 shows the overhead versus average node lifetime. As node lifetime increases, 
the overhead rapidly stabilizes at a low level. While most Internet-based file-sharing sys-
tems have relatively short node lifetimes, it is expected that a storage system would have 
see a much longer node lifetimes. Long lifetimes will be necessary, in any case, to avoid 
having normal use of the system dominated by the bandwidth costs of maintenance and 
replication [BR03]. 
3.5 Summary 
In summary, auditing with caching has a very low overhead, linear in the number of files 
stored and scaling well as the number of nodes in the system grows. Relative to the band-
width required for storing and retrieving files, the auditing overhead is of the order of tens 
of bps (bits per second), only a small fraction of a typical participating peer-to-peer node's 
bandwidth on an archival system. Auditing provides a practical and bandwidth-efficient 
mechanism to ensure fair sharing in storage-constrained systems, providing resistance to 
malicious nodes and scalability to large peer-to-peer systems. 
3.6 Related Work 
In a storage network, nodes share spare disk capacity for applications such as distributed 
backup systems. Tangier [WM01] is designed to provide censorship-resistant publication 
over a small number of servers (i.e., less than 30), exchanging data frequently with one 
another. To maintain fairness, Tangier requires servers to obtain "certificates" from other 
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servers which can be redeemed to publish files for a limited time. A new server can only 
obtain these certificates by providing storage for the use of other servers and is not allowed 
to publish anything for its first month online. As such, new servers must have demonstrated 
good services to the peer-to-peer system before being allowed to consume any system ser-
vices. 
Palimpsest [RH03], Tangier, and earlier systems like Gnutella and FreeNet all provide 
ephemeral storage. These systems make no guarantees that a file will be available indef-
initely. While popular files can be widely replicated, unpopular files will disappear for 
lack of interest and would then need to be reinserted. This contrasts with my work, where 
inserted files can live forever. 
Samsara [CN03] enforces fairness by charging peers storage space in the form of a 
claim, which can be replaced by real data when needed. The transfer of claims doubles 
the space and bandwidth required to store data. Claims can be forwarded to form chains or 
cycles to improve space efficiency. Since cycles can only be formed by chance, chains can 
grow to 0(N), where N is the size of the overlay network (they witnessed a chain consisting 
of over 3/4 of the nodes in their experiment). In this case, a single failure could cause a 
majority of nodes to lose data, casting doubts on the scalability of the system. 
Cooper and Garcia-Molina considered peer-to-peer trading for a small number of stor-
age sites and propose algorithms on peer selection in order to increase global reliabil-
ity [CGM02b]. Subsequently they described how auction and bidding could work, and 
examined policies for deciding when to call an auction and how much to bid [CGM02a]. 
38 
Chapter 4 
Streaming Systems 
4.1 Introduction 
In a media streaming system, a central node broadcasts a video and/or audio stream to 
subscribers. It is often necessary to leverage the subscribers' bandwidth to help dissemi-
nating the content. The participating nodes usually form a tree structure, with streaming 
content sent from the root through interior nodes to leaf nodes. Peer-to-peer multicast sys-
tems [CDK+03, CGN+04, JGJ+00, KRAV03, ZZJ+01] have demonstrated that when par-
ticipating nodes are cooperative, media streaming applications can scale to reliably support 
large numbers of nodes without the need for the costly server and network infrastructure. 
However, if a node was to refuse to transmit data to its downstream peers, or to accept 
any downstream peers, it could freeload on the system. If every node were to follow a sim-
ilar policy, the system as a whole would collapse. This chapter considers incentive issues 
in the context of peer-to-peer multicast streaming services. This work was done in collabo-
ration with Peter Druschel and Dan S. Wallach, and a preliminary version of this work was 
published in the Second Workshop on the Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems [NWD04]. 
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4.2 System Model 
The system described in this chapter, called FairStream, is designed to run on tree-based 
peer-to-peer multicast systems that concurrently use multiple trees. For concreteness, the 
description of the design is based on SplitStream [CDK+03]. 
SplitStream is an application-level multicast system built on top of Pastry. The key 
idea behind SplitStream is to split the original content stream into k stripes and to multicast 
each stripe using a separate multicast tree. Nodes subscribe to k different trees. Every node 
will (most likely) be an interior node in exactly one tree and will be a leaf node in the 
remaining k — 1 trees. If each node supports a fan-out to k children, then the total in-degree 
and out-degree would be equal. 
This splitting strategy in SplitStream is usually used in conjunction with a multiple 
description coder [ApoOl, AW01, MRLOO, PWCS02], so that the receivers' stream quality 
is proportional to the number of stripes they receive. Together, they provide robustness 
against packet loss, and also ensure a uniform sharing of the multicast transmission costs 
across participants. 
4.2.1 FairStream basics 
Similar to SplitStream, FairStream creates up to k concurrent multicast trees to stream 
the k parts of the multicast data. The stripe bandwidth is chosen such that every Internet 
user with a reasonable connection can receive and forward at least one stripe. In this way, 
users with weak Internet connections can still participate, albeit with a smaller number 
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of stripes. Moreover, nodes with more bandwidth would have an incentive to serve more 
children, because that will earn them more quality. The objective of the design is therefore 
to reward nodes that stream more content. 
Design objective: The more stream content a node forwards to other nodes (in a 
timely fashion), the more stream content it should receive from its peers. 
FairStream leaves the construction of multicast trees to the underlying multicast system. 
To avoid spending bandwidth to forward data, freeloaders may employ the following two 
strategies: 
Choking strategy A freeloader can refuse to forward any data to its children after a mul-
ticast tree is constructed by claiming that it could not receive any data. Downstream 
peers could not easily tell whether their parents were lying. 
Rejection strategy A freeloader can also refuse to accept children in the first place. A 
parent could do this by, perhaps, falsely claiming that it has already accepted enough 
children and its outgoing bandwidth is fully utilized. 
In the latter case, the problem cannot be solved simply by requesting a list of chil-
dren from a possible freeloader; such second-hand information could be easily falsified. A 
freeloading parent might, for example, claim that some conspiring nodes are its children. 
Such children would happily vouch that their parent is giving them services while it might, 
in fact, not be providing them any service at all. To avoid these issues, FairStream was 
designed to only gather information by direct observation. If a correct packet is received, 
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Figure 4.1: A hash chain, where each value of x is a hash of the value on its left. 
every node from the parent to the root must have forwarded it; on the other hand, if a packet 
is not received, any of the nodes from the parent to the root might be responsible for the 
loss. 
4.2.2 Data and path authenticity 
FairStream relies on the knowledge of the path to the roots in the multicast trees. A 
freeloader, of course, would not necessarily cooperate to provide such information cor-
rectly. False information might allow a freeloader to stay hidden or even to falsely de-
flect blame to a well-behaved peer. This problem can be alleviated by the use of com-
mon cryptography primitives. While a number of techniques would suffice to authenti-
cate a data stream and verify the integrity of its path, FairStream borrows ideas from hash 
chains [PCST01] and path authentication in Ariadne [HPJ02], which uses hash chains to 
achieve similar security semantics to digital signatures without requiring the overhead of 
expensive public-key cryptographic operations. In general, each packet will contain infor-
mation that can be used to validate the previous packet. 
First, the source creates a hash chain by randomly generating a value xn and iteratively 
computing x„_i,...,xo by xt = h(xt+\) with a cryptographically secure one-way hash func-
tion h (e.g., SHA-1), as shown in Figure 4.1. The source will reveal xo initially and sub-
sequent JC,'S, one per packet. As such, n should be relatively large to avoid the need to 
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redistribute new JCO'S very often. An important property of one-way hash functions is that 
while it is cheap to compute a hash, it is computationally infeasible to find its inverse. Thus, 
given xi+\, it is trivial to verify that it hashes to JC,-, but it is infeasible to find xt+\ from x,-. 
When the source sends the i'th packet, it also computes the packet's message digest 
di = /i(data,-,Jt,). Whenever an interior node sends the packet, it hashes the message di-
gest it receives from its parent with the receiving node's nodeld. Thus, the message di-
gest received by the source's child A would be h(di,A) and mat by A's child B would be 
h(h(di,A),B) and so on. Each packet will also include the base hash chain value used in 
the previous packet, i.e., the i + 1th packet contains X{. Upon receipt of X{, each node can 
confirm that JC,_I = h{xi). Each node can then verify the integrity of the previous packet by 
reconstructing the message digest using JC,- and the path it was told by its parent. 
In case of lost packets, a node only needs to hash the value multiple times until it 
matches the last seen *,•. Likewise, a node joining an ongoing streaming session only needs 
to keep hashing the value until it matches XQ. When multiple multicast trees are being used, 
each multicast tree can use a separate hash chain so that the functioning of one tree would 
not be interfered by another. 
Under this scheme, nodes cannot fake the path from the root to itself without knowing 
X(, which would not be revealed until after the packet becomes obsolete. In particular, it is 
not possible for a freeloader to remove any node in the path to the root. It should be noted, 
however, that it is possible for conspiring nodes to include additional nodes in the path. 
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4.3 FairStream Design 
This section describes the design of FairStream. FairStream focuses on mechanisms 
that individual nodes can follow, based strictly on information they observe about their 
peers, as well as information they can authenticate about nodes between themselves and 
the root of any given tree. 
4.3.1 Overview 
When a node participates in multicast streaming, it simultaneously interacts with many 
other nodes; for a system with k trees, it will typically have k parents and up to k children, 
not to mention its grandparents and other ancestors. If the trees are constantly rebuilt, the 
number of peers it has interacted with would keep growing over time. Nodes can easily 
account for services they have provided to and received from each peer. More importantly, 
nodes can also easily account how many times their peers have failed to provide them with 
good services. A peer that consistently fails to provide services is more likely to be a 
freeloader. Nodes can provide preferential services to peers that have proven cooperative 
history than peers that they barely know, and deny services to peers with suspicious tracks. 
Well-behaved nodes will be preferred by most nodes and receive near-perfect services, 
while freeloaders will be disliked by most nodes and denied services. 
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4.3.2 Periodic tree reconstruction 
When multicast trees are constructed, some nodes may be in unfair or unfavorable 
positions. A lucky node might happen to be a leaf in all trees, whereas an unlucky node 
might happen to be downstream from a freeloader that is refusing to forward data. By 
periodically reconstructing the multicast tree, a node will only benefit or suffer from such 
situations for a fixed time period at most. To avoid affecting the stream, new multicast trees 
can be constructed concurrently while existing trees are in use. In this way, at least k — 1 
out of the k trees will be available for streaming data at any time. Of course, it is imperative 
that the trees are constructed with certain degree of randomness, so that the new multicast 
tree will be sufficiently different from the old one. There will remain a tradeoff between the 
bandwidth overhead of tree reconstruction and the desire for smaller time steps. Smaller 
time steps allow nodes to respond more rapidly when they detect that a node is being selfish. 
4.3.3 Collecting information 
FairStream collects two measurements through first-hand observations, namely ances-
tor rating and parental availability. 
Ancestor rating. A node can monitor the services provided by its ancestors and decide 
how much confidence it has on them. The confidence values, denoted by c, are initially 0. 
Whenever a node receives a correct packet, it considers all the nodes in the path to the root, 
i.e., all its ancestors, have forwarded the packet and thus increments its confidence value 
of each node. Note that if the confidence values are incremented irrespective to the path 
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length, it would be possible for a node to help its conspiring peers to gain confidence from 
the downstream peers simply by claiming that the conspiring nodes are all its ancestors. 
The solution is to decrease the increment value for longer paths: The increment value is set 
to 1/2^, where I is the depth of the node from the root. Under this scheme, the confidence 
value a node earns will be halved for each additional node introduced, and the sum of the 
confidence values gained by conspiring nodes, if added as ancestors, would be no more 
than the confidence value gained by a single node if none of those conspiring nodes were 
added. 
Whenever an expected packet is not received, the node decrements the confidence value 
of each ancestor, blaming them all equally, for the lack of any more specific information. 
When the trees are reconstructed, any blame assigned falsely or due to lost packets would 
average out as nodes are later observed to behave correctly. Freeloading nodes, on the other 
hand, would be consistently blamed for their misbehavior. The decrement value is w/2e, 
for some system parameter w. Thus, decrements are w times faster than increments. 
Furthermore, positive confidence values are decayed over time, multiplied by a decay 
factor X after each time step. As a result, nodes will forget how good they peers have been, 
but they will remember how bad they were. Nodes are thus forced to continue providing 
services to maintain their peers' confidence. 
Parental availability. When a node joins a multicast tree and is refused services by its 
prospective parent, it has no way to determine if the prospective parent is genuinely at 
capacity or is freeloading. A freeloader can always claim to be serving its conspiring 
46 
peers. If a prospective parent has demonstrated a history of refusing to accept children, it 
is probably a freeloader. The likelihood that a peer is making itself available as a parent is 
defined as parental availability. The ability of a child to measure this parental availability 
will depend on the specific details of how multicast trees are constructed in any given 
system. 
In FairStream, the parental availability p is initialized to a default value /?jnit at the 
beginning. Each time when the node requests the peer to become its parent, this value is 
updated as a weighted average of its previous value and v € {0,1}, a value denoting whether 
its peer accepts to become its parent, by p' = Xp + (1 — A)v. In this way, a node has to 
constantly accept its peers as children if it wants to maintain a high parental availability 
among its peers. 
4.3.4 Reciprocal requests 
While well-behaved nodes would accept children in accordance with the prescribed 
protocol, freeloaders might regularly refuse to accept children. When a node A asks some 
prospective node B to be its parent, B needs a way to judge whether A has had a history 
of behaving selfishly. To address this, FairStream encourages B to occasionally break the 
join protocol and instead attempt to make A its parent by requesting to join directly under 
A for a multicast tree where A is supposed to be an interior node. This would allow B to 
determine whether A is misbehaving, and thus have a stronger basis for ignoring A in the 
future. 
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4.3.5 Selective servicing 
FairStream makes use of both the confidence value c and parental availability p to de-
cide whether to serve a peer. In particular, nodes should only accept children that have high 
confidence (c > c+) or with both sufficient confidence and sufficient parental availability 
(c > cth and p > pth)- Note that more emphasis is put on the confidence value because it is 
more effective in distinguishing misbehaving nodes, as to be shown in Section 4.4. Once a 
node believes that a peer is a freeloader, it should cease to provide services to the peer by 
refusing to accept those peers as their children. Moreover, when it gets request from a peer 
it has good relationship with (c > c+ and p > pth), it should make space for it by dropping 
children with mediocre relationship. 
Nodes should also be wary in choosing a parent, since a freeloader may accept children 
but refuse to forward data, which will in turn prevent them from forwarding data and affect 
their descendants' confidence. Specifically, a node should not request a peer to become its 
parent if its confidence on the peer is less than a minimum threshold (c < cmjn). 
4.4 Experimental Evaluation 
FairStream is implemented on top of SplitStream. This section evaluates FairStream 
through simulations. 
48 
4.4.1 Modification from SplitStream 
Other than the design changes as described in Section 4.3, the only modification we 
made in FairStream is the join protocol. In SplitStream, when a node joins a tree, it sends a 
subscribe message to a potential parent. If the potential parent does not accept the joining 
node, it will forward the subscribe message to other nodes in the tree to search for another 
parent. This prevents the joining node from knowing which nodes have refused to accept it 
as a child in the process. Therefore, we modified the join protocol so that the potential par-
ents will always reply directly to the joining node whenever it refuses to accept the joining 
node, with a list of other possible parents. The joining node will then send subscribe mes-
sages to those nodes itself. While this would add a constant factor to the communication 
overhead, it is necessary for maintaining parental availability. 
4.4.2 Experimental setup 
All simulations are based on a peer-to-peer multicast system with 500 nodes. The sim-
ulations include obedient nodes that follow the prescribed protocol, and both choking and 
rejection freeloaders. The system is built on top of a transit-stub topology model generated 
by Georgia Tech random graph generator [ZCB96]. The model has 1050 routers, 50 of 
which are transit routers. End nodes are assigned to the routers with uniform probability. 
The link delays between the routers are computed by the graph generator. The delay on 
intranet links is set to 1 ms. No end nodes are attached to transit routers. 
In all experiments, each node attempts to subscribe to all k = 16 trees, and each obedient 
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Figure 4.2: Average tree reconstruction cost for one tree. 
node will accept up to 16 children. The multicast source acts as the root of each tree and 
will blindly accept up to 16 children. At every time step, the source transmits one "data 
unit" to each multicast tree and then all trees are reconstructed. 
4.4.3 Tree reconstruction cost 
Tree reconstruction would not be feasible if the overhead was prohibitively expensive. 
The first experiment measures the cost of reconstructing and discarding trees. Figure 4.2 
shows the average number of messages sent by every node on a per tree basis. Since sub-
scribing to a tree involves simply sending a subscribe message to a specific nodeld, the cost 
is proportional to the logarithmic of the number of nodes. These messages are very small in 
size, so the overhead is minimal relative to typical data rates for streaming video. To unsub-
scribe from a tree, a node only needs to notify its parent to stop forwarding data, therefore 
the cost is constant. Moreover, this cost can be saved if all the nodes simultaneously discard 
the tree after finished forwarding all data for the period. 
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Figure 4.3: Fraction of multicast data received by obedient nodes with different types of freeload-
ers. 
To estimate the overhead in practice, consider video streaming to 500 nodes. Assume 
that the video is streaming at 128Kbps, the typical upstream bandwidth for a DSL user. 
Figure 4.2 shows that on average each node needs to send 11.5 messages to reconstruct one 
tree. Assume that each message is 128 bytes and all 16 multicast trees are reconstructed 
every two minutes, the total overhead would only be 1.2% of the stream. 
4.4.4 Fraction of freeloaders 
Next experiment studies the effect of freeloaders to the system. The fraction of stream 
data received by obedient nodes, after 64 tree reconstructions, is shown in Figure 4.3. 
Observe that the fraction of data received by obedient nodes is roughly equal to the fraction 
of obedient nodes in the system. This is because each additional freeloader essentially takes 
away one share of the bandwidth without contributing any back. 
Note that choking freeloaders hurt the system more than rejection freeloaders. This is 
because when a node is rejected by a freeloader, it can still look for another parent, while a 
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Figure 4.4: Cumulative distribution of negative confidence for obedient nodes and freeloaders. 
node that is accepted by a choking freeloader will be stuck under the freeloader and receives 
no data. 
4.4.5 SpIitStream properties 
In order to find suitable parameters for FairStream, we run the following experiments 
for 256 time steps to measure typical confidence and parent availability value distributions. 
Confidence. This experiment consists of 5% choking freeloaders. Figure 4.4 shows the 
distribution of negative confidence. While obedient nodes rarely have negative confidence, 
around 90% of freeloaders have confidence values less than —4. It shows that the confi-
dence values can effectively distinguish selfish nodes. For example, by setting a threshold 
of —0.22, a choking freeloader can be positively identified by more than 99% of nodes in 
the system with only 1% false positives. 
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Parental availability. In this experiment, we try to understand parental availability (a 
child's rating of how likely a given parent was to accept it as a child). The simulation con-
sists of only obedient nodes. Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of parental availability when 
all nodes are willing to accept children. While most of the time the parental availability is 
quite high and more than 80%, it is becoming more common to have lower parental avail-
ability as the number of transfers increases. If a node was a rejection freeloader, its parent 
availability would be zero. To cut off parents with low availability, we must be careful to 
avoid false positives, particularly given that many legitimate parents have low ratings. For 
example, a cutoff of 0.8 might normally reject 10% of the legitimate parents. 
4.4.6 Enforcing FairStream policies 
Finally, the last experiments evaluate the effectiveness of enforcing FairStream policies. 
The following parameters are chosen based on empirical testing: c+ = 0.1, c^ = —0.22, 
cmin = -0.32, w = 3.07, p th = 0.37, and X = 0.9. 
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This experiment consists of 480 obedient nodes and 20 freeloaders. Ten of these 
freeloaders begin freeloading immediately while the other ten start freeloading only af-
ter 32 reconstructions. Half of freeloaders use the choking strategy, while the other half use 
the rejection strategy. The results are shown in Figure 4.6. 
The figure shows that the fraction of data received by obedient nodes is always close 
to 100%, without being affected by freeloaders. The errorbars for obedient nodes show the 
standard deviations. The ranges are very small, which suggests that the variance experi-
enced by obedient nodes is very low. Meanwhile, freeloaders cease to receive much data 
after they start to freeload. Note that this fraction never goes to 0, since there is a slim 
chance (16/500 = 3.2%) that a freeloader can become a child of the source, which does 
not use any mechanism to track freeloading behaviors. It can also be observed that initial 
cooperation followed by freeloading behavior has only a limited effect in the short term 
and no effect in the long term. 
The last experiment shows the effects of different fractions of freeloaders. The result, 
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Figure 4.7: Fraction of multicast data received by obedient nodes with different fraction of freeload-
ers after applying my mechanisms. 
after 64 time units, is shown in Figure 4.7. Comparing to Figure 4.3, the data received 
by obedient nodes is almost not affected when the system has less than 40% freeloaders. 
Beyond that, the fraction drops more quickly. Regardless, the fraction is still significantly 
higher than if the mechanisms were not used, up to the extent of 70% freeloaders. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter describes the design and simulation results of FairStream, a system with 
fully decentralized mechanisms to incentivize cooperations in peer-to-peer multicast stream-
ing. By regularly rebuilding multicast trees and having nodes to only track their first-
hand observed behavior of their peers, nodes can easily distinguish freeloaders from well-
behaved nodes. Based on that, nodes can deny service to freeloaders. Experimental re-
sults show that FairStream greatly reduces the quality of service received by freeloaders 
and improves that for well-behaved nodes. The network and computational overhead of 
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FairStream is low, making it practical to be deployed to current systems and make cooper-
ative peer-to-peer applications more robust. 
4.6 Related Work 
Nicolosi and Mazieres [NM04] proposed a technique for the sender of multicast data to 
confirm message delivery to all receivers. While this method can help the sender to learn 
the identity of nodes refusing to forward data, it does not prevent nodes from refusing to 
accept children. 
Habib and Chuang [HC04] considered a model where a node makes a request and 
selects to receive services from a set of candidate suppliers. Since each individual node 
makes its own requests, it is similar to general file sharing. Moreover, they assumed a 
reliable peer-to-peer trust system, which is still an active research area. 
Chu et al. [CGN+04] have deployed an operational Internet broadcast system based on 
overlay multicast, which has a peak user size of a few hundreds and provides reasonably 
good performance. However, since the content are usually conference/lecture-type broad-
cast, they are generally less susceptible to freeloading behaviors comparing to what might 
be in a general system. 
Chu et al. [CCZ04] considered a taxation model, where resource-rich peers are required 
to contribute more bandwidth to the system to subsidize for the resource-poor peers. While 
their simulation showed that taxation can improve social welfare, it is unclear whether 
requiring the publisher to enforce taxation can effectively scale with the system size. 
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Chapter 5 
Content Distribution Systems 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers the incentive problem in the context of general content distribu-
tion systems. Unlike existing systems like BitTorrent [Coh03], where peers are interested 
in obtaining the same objects, a general content distribution system consists of both pop-
ular and unpopular objects. A fair policy, as used in BitTorrent, is "tit-for-tat," preferring 
to transmit content to other nodes who are willing to return the favor. This policy has the 
desirable property that no strategy can do any better than the population average [Axe81]. 
However, in this more general setting, a simultaneous swap of content is rarely possible. 
This chapter describes a system called Scrivener. Scrivener encourages uploading con-
tent by allowing peers to accumulate pairwise credit that can be redeemed at a later time, 
for unrelated content from unrelated peers. 
Design objective: The more content a node serves to other nodes, the more easily I 
it should be able to retrieve content from the system. I 
This work was done in collaboration with Animesh Nandi, Atul Singh, Peter Druschel, 
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and Dan S. Wallach, and was published in the ACM/IFIP/USENIX Sixth International 
Middleware Conference [NNS+05]. 
5.2 Background: BitTorrent 
BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file sharing communication protocol, tailored for distribut-
ing large amounts of data widely. In BitTorrent, users share a file or group of files via a 
torrent file. This torrent file contains metadata about the files to be shared and about the 
tracker, which is a central computer that acts as a rendezvous point. The set of peers that 
are interested in downloading a particular tracker is known as a swarm. Once a node has 
completely downloaded the file, it becomes a seed and uploads the file to all requesters. 
BitTorrent provides incentives for users to upload content through a tit-for-tat strat-
egy [Coh03]. Each BitTorrent node has a fixed number of uploading slots (default is four), 
and preferentially spends its uploading slots on peers which currently provide it with good 
downstream bandwidth. To discover if currently unused connections are better than the 
ones being used, a BitTorrent node also uses one uploading slot optimistically on other 
peers in the swarm in a round-robin fashion, regardless of its download rate. 
Despite the measures BitTorrent has taken to induce incentives, more recent studies 
show that they are not strategyproof. First, BitTorrent nodes can download without upload-
ing by collecting and connecting to more peers in the swarm [LMSW06]; sometimes they 
can even achieving better download rates than a compliant BitTorrent client [SPCY07]. Pi-
atek et al. propose a strategic BitTorrent client called BitTyrant [PIA+07] that provides a 
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median 70% performance gain over a compliant BitTorrent client. 
5.3 Goals and System Model 
Scrivener is designed for cooperative content distribution systems where participants 
wish to obtain content stored on other participants' computers. Content is assumed to 
be published by its owner and disseminated into the system for distribution. Scrivener is 
designed under the assumption that, at least for popular objects, the owner has insufficient 
bandwidth to service every possible request and wishes to leverage the bandwidth available 
among other nodes in the system. 
The set of participating nodes is assumed to form an overlay network. Scrivener is 
based on mechanisms that in principle can be applied to both unstructured [Gnu, Kaz] 
and structured overlay networks [RDOla, SMK+01], as long as they meet the following 
minimal requirements: 
1. Each node in the overlay communicates directly with only a bounded (i.e., constant 
or logarithmic in the size of the overlay) number of overlay neighbors; 
2. The overlay has a mechanism to discover new overlay neighbors; and 
3. The overlay supports a search primitive that discovers, when given a valid content 
identifier, one or more overlay paths to a node that stores content associated with that 
identifier. 
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5.3.1 Goals 
Scrivener's goal is to achieve fair sharing of bandwidth in content distribution systems. 
The key aspects of this goal are summarized below. 
• Fairness. The system must ensure that participants receive a quality of service that is 
proportional to the amount of bandwidth they are actually contributing to the system. 
Furthermore, no participant should be permitted to perpetually consume resources in 
excess of their contributions at the expense of another participant. This provides an 
incentive for nodes to not freeload. 
• Low overhead. The overhead imposed by the mechanisms used should be modest. 
Moreover, the marginal cost related to ensuring fairness when downloading an object 
should be low, to ensure efficiency despite small object sizes. 
• Robustness. The system should retain the above properties even in the presence of 
large numbers of freeloaders and in the presence of modest churn. 
5.4 Design 
This section provides a more detailed description of Scrivener's design. 
5.4.1 Relationships 
Each Scrivener node maintains relationships with a small number of other nodes, typ-
ically its overlay neighbors, as selected by the overlay protocol. More precisely, any two 
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nodes in the overlay network form a relationship if and only if at least one of them has the 
other in its overlay neighbor table. A Scrivener node A grants a small initial confidence 
value (and thus a small credit limit) to any node that A has chosen as a neighbor, but it 
assigns an initial confidence of zero (and thus no credit) to any node that has invited A to be 
a neighbor. This prevents freeloaders from obtaining a large credit limit by initiating many 
relationships with many nodes, perhaps pretending that its normal neighbors have failed.1 
The small initial credit limit allows neighbors chosen by A to request contents from A, 
and it allows A to request content from legitimate nodes who have chosen A as a neighbor. 
As contents are exchanged, the parties gain more confidence in each other and gradually 
grant each other larger credit limits. This scheme puts newcomers at a disadvantage; they 
need to initiate relationships, forcing them to grant credits and offer services while re-
ceiving little in return initially. This is the price for defending against freeloaders in any 
reputation-based system [FR01]. However, as below shows, the initial sacrifice is rewarded 
quickly as the node establishes confidence and gains credits with its neighbors. 
When a Scrivener node A finds that one of its neighbors B has accumulated debt in 
excess of its credit limit, it ceases to accept requests from B. Regardless, A continues to 
make requests to B in order to give B the opportunity to pay back its debt. Likewise, A 
may find that the confidence value of one of its neighbors B has dropped to zero, perhaps 
because B has repeatedly failed to fulfill requests from A even though A is in good standing 
1
 Overlay network systems are generally engineered to assume a high rate of node failure and include 
elaborate mechanisms to locate previously unknown nodes and form new relationships in order to preserve 
important invariants, including the degree of node-to-node connectivity and of file replication. As a result, 
Scrivener needs to limit the benefits automatically granted to a node solely because it happens to be a peer. 
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with B. In this case, A ceases to make requests via B or to accept requests from B. From 
A's perspective, B might as well not be a part of the overlay network. A then uses existing 
mechanisms provided by the overlay network to replace B with a different, and hopefully 
more cooperative, neighbor. 
In principle, a Scrivener node must maintain a record of its past overlay neighbors 
indefinitely. Erasing a negative record would amount to forgiving debt, and would enable 
freeloading. In practice, it is acceptable to delete records of nodes that have been offline for 
long periods, perhaps a year, thus seriously inconveniencing freeloaders who wish to ex-
ploit the resulting loophole. Storing a year's worth of records is reasonable as these records 
are very compact: only a nodeld and two integer values, the credit and confidence values, 
are required. Such concise records could easily scale to track the millions of neighbors that 
a node might see in a year's time. 
Note also that due to the pairwise relationships, freeloader cannot benefit from collu-
sion. While colluding freeloaders may be able to convince legitimate nodes to shift credit 
from one freeloader to another, the total credit will remain unchanged. 
5.4.2 Confidence 
Scrivener nodes keep a confidence estimate for each of their overlay neighbors. The 
confidence value serves two purposes: (1) it determines the magnitude of the credit limit 
granted to a neighbor and (2) it can be used to bias overlay routing decisions towards 
cooperative neighbors. 
The confidence assigned by a node to its neighbor is based on the history of their rela-
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tionship. The confidence estimate has the following properties: 
1. As nodes exchange content, the confidence increases slowly; 
2. The confidence drops rapidly once a neighbor starts to misbehave; and 
3. The confidence is bounded to limit the damage caused by a node that plays by the 
rules for an extended period and then starts to freeload. 
An additive increase, multiplicative decrease (AIMD) strategy offers a simple imple-
mentation of these properties. 
5.4.3 Transitive trade 
In peer-to-peer content distribution systems with a large content set, the odds that a 
desired object can be found on an immediate overlay neighbor of the node wishing to fetch 
that object are small. In general, there is a need for nodes to trade their credits and debts 
with one another, preferably at the same time avoiding the overhead of digital cash or other 
cryptographic schemes. Scrivener employs an incremental trading strategy called transitive 
trade, which works by identifying a credit path from a source node to a node that has the 
desired object. In a credit path, each node in the path either has credit with the next node, 
or its debt is below the next node's credit limit. A scheme to locate such paths is described 
in Section 5.5.2. 
Conceivably, once a credit path has been identified, it is possible to rearrange all the 
credits in the path such that the destination node now owes something not to its predecessor 
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Figure 5.1: How a node can use a credit path to leverage a chain of credit to obtain content directly 
from a non-neighbor node. 
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Figure 5.2: The stages in the transitive trade protocol. 
in the route, but instead to the source of the route. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1. A series 
of debts, where B owes A, C owes B, and so forth until Z owes its predecessor could all be 
replaced with a direct debt from Z to A. Z can now cancel this debt by providing A with the 
desired content. 
To make debt swapping work, a protocol that is robust against any node in the trading 
chain cheating is needed. For example, a node could attempt to cancel a debt that it owes 
without giving up the debt owed to it by the successor in the trading chain. Rather than 
resorting to a complex cryptographic commitment protocol, Scrivener takes a straightfor-
ward, incremental approach. The protocol is depicted in Figure 5.2. 
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1: Credit path discovery: A first routes a "path discovery" message (PD) towards Z. As 
a side effect, A "pays" B for this message, B pays C, and so forth until Z is paid. At 
the same time, each node reduces its confidence in its successor as if the request had 
failed (even though it may be working perfectly well). This design avoids the need to 
maintain timeouts to detect and react to failures. The credit path discovery might fail 
for a number of reasons, ranging from a freeloader dropping the message to network 
failures (see Section 5.5.2). The effect is that every node that forwarded the request 
will have reduced confidence in its successor. Furthermore, the last node in the chain 
effectively keeps the credit originally transferred from A. 
2a: Object exists: Upon receiving the request, Z transmits a confirmation message (ACK) 
directly to A. A now routes a request message (REQ) for a chunk of the content object 
along the existing credit path, paying for the chunk as a side-effect of the message 
transmission. Z transmits the requested object chunk directly to A. A repeats this step 
until it has obtained the last chunk of the object. A final message, announcing A's 
success, causes each node to adjust the confidence value of its successor to compen-
sate for the reduction in step (1), plus an additional confidence gained as a result of 
the trade. 
2b: Object does not exist: Upon receiving the request, Z routes a "does not exist" mes-
sage (DNE) along the reverse credit path. The message contains the addresses of the 
complete set of nodes that would store replicas of the content if it existed. Interme-
diate nodes can contact a member of this set to verify that the object does not exist. 
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If they are convinced that the object really does not exist, they restore the confidence 
of the successor node to compensate for the reduction taken in step (1). 
Each participating node has an incentive to follow each of the protocol steps: Node A 
wants to receive all the chunks, node Z wants to be credited for transmitting all the chunks, 
and all nodes wish to maintain the confidence of their predecessors along the credit path. 
When a node defects from the protocol at some stage, it can collect credit without providing 
the corresponding service. However, the price is a drop in the confidence of the node's 
predecessor. Also, the damage is limited to the size of a single chunk, which can be made 
appropriately small. 
In general, for any failure, the client A is charged for at most a single chunk — a modest 
loss. The charge can be interpreted as the price for imposing load on the overlay by issuing 
a request that could not be satisfied. Such a charge also discourages flooding requests 
into the system; the client must pay for each and every request it makes. The client can 
minimize the loss associated with a failure when it begins with a small chunk and gradually 
increases the request size as its confidence in the path increases. 
Over the long term, transitive trading tends to balance credit and debt among a node's 
overlay neighbors, maximizing the chances that the node will be able to obtain content in 
the future. Moreover, participation in a transitive trade is beneficial because it increases the 
confidence of each node along the path in its successor. 
At the same time, nodes have a disincentive to refuse participation in a transitive trade. 
Such a refusal leads the predecessor along the credit path to reduce its confidence in the 
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node. While the failure of a neighbor adversely affects a node, if it happens repeatedly, the 
node quickly reduces its confidence in that neighbor, and avoids routing messages through 
that neighbor in the future. As a result, failing nodes are avoided by the neighbors and 
become isolated. 
It is important mat nodes are not penalized for being offline. When a node is offline, 
other nodes merely suspend their relationship with the node until it returns. A related 
question is whether a node has an incentive to swap credit from an established neighbor to 
a newcomer as part of a transitive trade. In practice, having credit with a large and diverse 
set of neighbors maximizes the chances that a node will be able to successfully locate a 
credit path for a future request. 
5.4.4 Caching 
In general, objects in a content distribution system have a highly skewed popularity 
distribution [GDS+03]. To avoid load imbalances as a result of such skew, caching is 
used in these systems to dynamically adjust the number of nodes serving a content object 
according to its popularity. Typically, once a node has obtained some content for itself, it 
serves the content to other interested clients from its local cache. Thus, popular objects 
tend to be replicated widely. 
In Scrivener, dynamic caching is required to address an additional form of imbalance 
caused by skewed popularity. Without caching, nodes serving popular objects would tend 
to accumulate a huge amount of credit. Nodes that serve less popular objects would tend 
to accumulate debt and lack the "earning potential" to ever repay the debt. Simulations 
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(see Section 5.6) will demonstrate this effect in action and show how caching addresses 
the problem. Moreover, nodes have an incentive to cache objects, because it increases their 
earning potential. Caching popular objects allows a node to earn the credit needed to satisfy 
its own future needs. 
5.5 Implementation 
This section describes an implementation of a prototype of Scrivener. It is implemented 
using FreePastry [Fre] with a distributed hash table service called PAST [RDOla, RDOlb]. 
Scrivener uses only the key-based routing (KBR) API [DZD+03] exported by FreePastry. 
Thus, this implementation will also work with any structured overlay that supports this 
interface, e.g., Chord [SMK+01]. 
5.5.1 Node bootstrapping 
Recall that when a new node joins the system, it has no credit or debt. To earn credit, it 
needs to obtain some initial content that it can serve to other nodes. In our implementation, 
PAST's normal content placement and replication policy provides a node with its initial set 
of content objects. 
When a PAST node joins the system, it is required to store a set of objects based on its 
position in the identifier space. The node obtains these initial objects from its neighbors 
in the id space for free; they form the new node's initial content offering and allow it to 
acquire credit with its overlay neighbors, which forward requests for these objects to the 
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node as part of PAST's normal lookup operation. The simulation results show that this 
simple mechanism suffices for a node to quickly bootstrap itself. 
5.5.2 Finding credit paths 
A key implementation issue is how to efficiently discover credit paths. The Pastry 
routing primitive finds an overlay path to a node that stores the requested content object, 
given the object's identifier. Finding a credit path introduces the additional constraint that 
each node along the path must be in good standing with its successor. 
We use a randomized, greedy algorithm to discover credit paths. To determine the 
next hop, a Scrivener node first selects the set of neighbors that satisfy the Pastry routing 
constraint. These nodes either have identifiers that match the requested object handle in a 
longer prefix than the present node's id, or their ids match as long a prefix as the present 
node's id but are numerically closer to the object handle. Forwarding the request to a node 
in this set guarantees that the route is loop-free and will end at a node that has the desired 
content, assuming the content exists in the overlay. 
Next, any neighboring nodes where the present node is not in good standing is sub-
tracted from the candidate set. These neighbors would refuse requests from the present 
node because it had exceeded its credit limit. Because all of the information used by nodes 
to rate their neighbors is available equally to both parties, nodes can easily track their 
standing with their neighbors. 
Among the set of remaining candidate nodes, a biased random choice is made, based 
on the following criteria: 
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• Length of the neighbor's prefix matches with the object handle. Choosing a neighbor 
with higher prefix match than the present node reduces the latency and path length, 
and therefore also increases the chance to find a working path. 
• Confidence in the neighbor. Neighbors with higher confidence values have been 
more helpful in the past, and are thus more likely to be helpful this time. 
• Amount of credit with the neighbor. Choosing neighbors with higher credit helps the 
present node to balance credit and debt and therefore increases flexibility in handling 
future requests. 
Scrivener strongly biases the forwarding choice toward neighbors with a prefix match 
(minimizing the number of overlay routing hops), while also trying to balance credit and 
debt, and gives preference to neighbors with high confidence values. More precisely, let ^ 
denote the set of candidate nodes. Scrivener assigns a score to each node x in ^ , which is 
calculated as score(;c) = e^ xt(x)x [c(x) - cm\n +1], where £(x) > 0 is the number of ad-
ditional digits that the neighbor x shares with the object handle relative to the present node, 
c(x) and t(x) are the credit and confidence value of neighbor x, and cm\n = min,G^c(/). 
Then the probability that peer x is chosen (p(x)) is its score divided by the total score of all 
candidate peers, i.e., p(x) = score(^)/£(G<^score(i). The quality of a node's prefix match 
figures exponentially in its score to give a significantly greater weight to shorter routes. 
Note also that both confidence and credit/debt are measured in the same units, i.e., the 
number of objects or bytes transferred. 
This randomized, greedy algorithm is not guaranteed to discover a credit path even 
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if one exists. A request could end up at a node that has no neighbor that satisfies the 
Pastry routing constraints and with which the node is in good standing. In such case, the 
request cannot be forwarded and the client will need to retry the request through a different 
neighbor. 
Our simulations shows that the success rate of finding a credit path is very high and the 
number of retries typically necessary to discover a credit path is very low in practice. There 
are several reasons for this. First, the Pastry overlay is richly connected and many redundant 
paths exist between a client and a node holding the required content. Second, dynamic 
caching effectively balances the "earning power" of nodes, avoiding strong imbalances in 
the credit available to different nodes. Third, the bias in the forwarding policy against 
nodes with low confidence tends to isolate freeloaders, causing requests to be effectively 
routed around such nodes. Lastly, the bias in the forwarding policy based on credit tends 
to balance the available credit a node has with its different neighbors. These various self-
stabilizing forces reduce the probability that a credit path search might fail, either due to 
lack of credit or because a freeloader refuses to honor it. 
5.5.3 Bounding lengths of credit paths 
Unlike the native Pastry routing policy, Scrivener does not always choose a neighbor 
with a longer prefix match, even if such a neighbor exists. As a result, Pastry's logarithmic 
bound on the expected path lengths does not strictly hold. Note that shorter path lengths are 
desirable for two important reasons: (1) shorter path lengths ensure low delay and network 
utilization, and (2) shorter paths are more robust against node failures. Since the routing 
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policy of Scrivener may occasionally lead to long paths, it is resort to another mechanism 
to bound the path length. 
In our implementation, Scrivener artificially bounds the credit path length to be loga-
rithmic in the overlay size. When the search for a credit path has reached this bound, the 
request is dropped. A rough estimate of the size of the overlay N suffices to determine the 
bound. Since nodelds are assigned at random, the overlay size can be extrapolated from 
the local density of nodelds with sufficient accuracy. When a search exceeds this bound-
ary, the request is dropped. Our simulation results, presented in Section 5.6, show that the 
impact of this restriction on the ability to locate credit paths is minimal, while it ensures 
deterministic bounds on the system's resource consumption. 
5.6 Experimental Results 
This section presents simulation results to evaluate our implementation. In the simula-
tion, network messages are delivered instantaneously. Objects are replicated using PAST's 
replication strategy, storing an object on the k nodes with nodelds closest to the identifier 
for that object. When requesting an object, client nodes perform at most 10 queries, each 
time attempting to discover a credit path using the randomized greedy algorithm. The ini-
tial credit limit is set to one object, and increases linearly with the confidence the node has 
in its peer. The credit paths are limited to |"31ogAf| hops. Each node also has a fixed sized, 
1024-object soft cache to retain objects it has previously obtained to satisfy future requests. 
A least recently used (LRU) cache replacement policy is implemented to replace entries 
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from the cache when it is full. 
A node's peers maintain their credit and confidence values for a node that is temporarily 
offline. Also, the Pastry routing tables are persistent, i.e., a node remembers its table while 
it is offline. Inappropriate entries are simply replaced by the existing overlay maintenance 
mechanisms, but biased towards peers with which the node already has a relationship. As 
a last resort, the node initiates a new relationship. Also, for each entry in the routing table, 
a node maintains at most three neighbors but uses only the one with the highest confidence 
value. (Confidence estimation is described in Section 5.4.2.) 
5.6.1 Workload model 
The workload model is generated according to Gummadi et al. [GDS+03]. This model, 
derived from Kazaa traffic observations, captures the fetch-at-most-once behavior and the 
importance of new object arrivals in typical peer-to-peer file sharing applications. Based on 
this model, we choose the following parameters: Number of nodes online C = 800, number 
of objects 0 = 40,000, request rate per node XR = 50, object arrival rate Xo = 12, and node 
arrival rate XQ = 5 (the units are nodes or objects per simulation time unit). The node 
departure rate is the same as the arrival rate, keeping the number of active nodes constant. 
Each object is initially replicated to k = 3 nodes. There is a fixed pool of 1,000 distinct 
nodes, out of which 800 are online at any time. As a result, during the first 40 time units 
all arriving nodes are fresh, but after time 40 all arriving nodes are those that were online 
once before. Nodes that go offline are chosen randomly from the currently live nodes. 
73 
1 rTmw+wwiwj^<i)iHt.Hti {W iwni mmi 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
x 
x ^ x x></Xx*W< J? xXx%« W^^< x x: 
With caching 
No caching 
^ 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
Time units 
Figure 5.3: Success rate with only obedient nodes. 
5.6.2 System performance 
The first experiment studies how the mechanisms affect the performance of the under-
lying cooperative content distribution system in the absence of freeloaders. In particular, it 
investigates how much overhead is added to the system. 
Success rate. Figure 5.3 shows the fraction of successful requests, both with and without 
caching. Without caching, the success rate stabilizes around 80%. This is because object 
popularity is so uneven that nodes around the replicas of popular objects become indebted 
to the replica holders, making it sometimes impossible for a node to find a credit path to the 
replicas. Many requests to popular objects fail despite retries. However, allowing nodes to 
serve cached objects eliminates this problem and the success rate approaches 100%. The 
stability of the success rate suggests that the system balances out nicely and obedient nodes 
do not build up debt over time.2 
2Another experiment makes use of speculative caching, where nodes observe the requests they have for-
warded and actively fetch objects that they consider popular. However, the improvements observed in terms 
of success rate were insignificant. 
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Figure 5.4 shows the number of retries required to successfully find a credit path. When 
caching is enabled, over 73% of queries succeed on the first attempt, and three attempts are 
sufficient to achieve over 95% success rate. We conclude that the policy enforcement in 
Scrivener with bounded paths does not seriously affect object fetch reliability in the absence 
of freeloaders. 
Path efficiency. Scrivener's randomized greedy routing strategy attempts to use Pastry's 
routing mechanism to achieve logarithmic-length paths, when possible, and falls back 
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to less efficient mechanisms, when necessary, that are artificially capped to preserve an 
O(logiV) expected path length (see Section 5.5.3). A cumulative distribution of path lengths 
at different overlay sizes is shown in Figure 5.5. By observing horizontal slices through this 
graph, the growth in path length follows roughly the log of the number of nodes. The simu-
lations show that common case routes are quite efficient and the worst case routes are only 
twice as long as common-case routes. 
Due to limitations of the simulation environment, we cannot run simulations for overlay 
sizes larger than 2000. In order to emulate the effect of larger overlay sizes, simulations 
with 1000 nodes are used, but with Pastry's routing base set to b = 2 instead of 4. The 
results show that the median Scrivener path lengths is around 5, close to the expected 
Pastry path length (log221000 « 4.98). Note that when b = 4, the expected path length for 
a Pastry overlay with one million nodes is 5. given destination. This result suggests that 
Scrivener's greedy routing strategy easily scales to much larger overlay sizes than it was 
simulated. 
These longer paths, which also occur as the number of nodes in the overlay increases, 
raise concerns about path usability, particularly if the system is experiencing high node 
churn. More nodes in a path increases the odds that one of these nodes will fail while a 
transitive trade is in progress. However, the system provides incentives for nodes to stay 
online until a transitive trade in which they are involved completes (see Section 5.4.3). If a 
path fails, the original requesting node can restart the trading protocol, find a new path to 
the source of the data (or a replica), and resume downloading the missing data. 
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The total overhead for Scrivener to fetch an object is the product of the average number 
of attempts to discover a credit path (« 2) and the average credit path length (< [3 \ogN]). 
Among competing systems that use auditor sets, KARMA [VCS03] is the most efficient 
known system. KARMA's asymptotic message overhead is comparable to Scrivener's, but 
requires expensive public-key cryptographic operations and additional means of incentiviz-
ing auditors. 
Introducing freeloaders. Next, we introduce freeloaders into the simulations. Freeload-
ers issue requests like obedient nodes, but they may refuse to serve objects. In a deployed 
system, freeloaders can be expected to attempt a variety of strategies. We consider a num-
ber of freeloading strategies, and show that in all cases there are no sustainable benefits to 
freeloading. The simulations consist of 800 nodes with 5% freeloaders. We assume that 
freeloaders forward requests and participate in transitive trades, as this allows them to earn 
confidence with minimal traffic overhead. While obedient nodes undergo churn as spec-
ified in the model, freeloaders are always online throughout the entire simulation period. 
Recall that routing tables are persistent, ensuring that freeloaders cannot neither escape a 
bad reputation by periodically departing from the system nor by repeatedly exploiting the 
limited credit granted by obedient nodes looking to establish relationships. 
Freeloaders that never serve. The first experiment considers freeloaders that never serve 
any object. Figure 5.6 shows that their success rate drops to below 5% within a few time 
units, yet that of obedient nodes is unaffected. Note that the success rate for freeloaders 
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Figure 5.7: Success rate with 50% freeloaders that do not serve objects. 
never goes to zero. This is because freeloaders can still get the objects that they themselves 
are storing "for free." 
To determine Scrivener's sensitivity to the size of the soft cache, the cache size is re-
duced. The success rate remains virtually constant down to a cache size of 320 objects, and 
gradually decreases to 91% at 128 objects. This shows that Scrivener does not require a 
large soft cache to work efficiently. 
The next experiment increased the fraction of freeloaders to 50%, with results shown 
in Figure 5.7. The success rate of freeloaders again drops quickly to near zero, while that 
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Figure 5.8: Success rate with a higher churn rate. 
for obedient nodes starts below 60% and plateaus at 80%. Note that with 50% freeloaders 
and a replication factor k = 3, it is expected that 12.5% of the objects are only stored by 
freeloaders and will thus never be served. This suggests that a more expensive search may 
increase the success rate somewhat, but with diminishing returns. 
To test the system under extreme conditions, we further increased the fraction of freeload-
ers to 80%. At this point, more than half of the objects are stored only by freeloaders and, 
unsurprisingly, the success rate for obedient nodes is only 30%. Also, as a result of more 
transitive trading failures, it takes longer for the success rate of obedient nodes to stabi-
lize. Scrivener does continue to function remarkably well, despite the extreme freeloading 
rate. Given that these freeloaders receive no benefit from being present in the network, 
one would expect them to depart, allowing the remaining obedient nodes to operate more 
efficiently. 
Since it takes time for obedient nodes to recognize freeloaders, one concern is that a 
high churn rate might enable freeloaders to get a satisfactory success rate by exploiting 
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confidence to all freeloaders. 
newly arrived nodes. To simulate that effect, we increased the churn rate Xc to 50 nodes 
per time unit and with fresh nodes arriving for the first 100 time units. After time 100, the 
arriving nodes have all previously been part of the network and gone offline. Figure 5.8 
clearly shows that with this higher churn of fresh nodes, the success rate for freeloaders 
stabilizes at around 15%, dropping after time 100 when the returning nodes remember 
previous freeloaders. Thus, while freeloaders can exploit newcomers, the benefit is limited. 
More importantly, the success rate for obedient nodes is unaffected. While obedient nodes 
waste some effort handling requests from freeloaders, they give clear priority to serving 
each other. 
Recall that a Scrivener node grants an initial credit to its chosen neighbors. The next 
experiment considers an attack where a freeloader somehow convinces an obedient node to 
choose it as a neighbor, thus granting it an initial credit. It considers a worst-case scenario 
where freeloaders can always manipulate obedient nodes into choosing them as neighbors. 
With such an attack, freeloaders could now exploit the initial credit from each obedient 
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Figure 5.10: Success rate with freeloaders that participates in transitive trades but do not fetch 
objects for the first 20 time units. 
node. Figure 5.9 shows that, indeed, freeloaders get a better success rate initially. However, 
the success rate drops to 30% quickly and gradually goes down as obedient nodes refuse 
to serve freeloaders after their debts built up. This simulation shows that, even with such a 
hypothetical attack, freeloaders would have little benefit and obedient nodes would observe 
no significant change in their own success rate. 
Short-term cooperation. Participation in transitive trades, alone, can earn confidence 
and increase credit limits without actually serving any object. An interesting question is 
whether it is possible for freeloaders to build up confidence simply by participating in 
transitive trades, and then exploit that confidence. Figure 5.10 shows a simulation where 
freeloaders participate in transitive trades for 20 time units before fetching any object. The 
success rate for freeloaders drops to below 0.1 within ten time units. Thus, participation in 
transitive trades does have a benefit, but only a small one. 
The next simulation shows nodes that were obedient for 20 time units and then began 
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Figure 5.11: Success rate with freeloaders that serve objects only for the first 20 time units. 
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Figure 5.12: Number of objects served and fetched with freeloaders that serve half of the object 
requests. 
freeloading. As shown in Figure 5.11, the freeloader's success rate now takes seven time 
units to drop below 0.1. The freeloader does benefit from its earlier obedience. However, 
once freeloading behavior begins, the success rate remains high for only two time units, 
then falls quickly. 
These experiments demonstrate that short-term cooperation is not an effective strategy 
for freeloaders to exploit the system; once they start to freeload, obedient nodes will quickly 
refuse to serve them. 
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Figure 5.13: Success rate and number of objects served and fetched with freeloaders that aim at 
50% success rate. 
Providing partial service. Another possible freeloading behavior is to serve objects at a 
reduced rate. The first experiment considers freeloaders that arbitrarily serve half of their 
requests. Figure 5.12 shows that the success rate for freeloaders drops to and remains at 
roughly 50% — the same rate at which they are providing service. Note also that the 
number of objects received by freeloaders also approaches and stabilizes at the same level 
as the number they serve. 
Another potential strategy is to have a target quality of service. This freeloading be-
havior serves only enough requests to maintain a desired success ratio. The simulation 
considers freeloaders that target a 50% success rate. Figure 5.13 shows that the result-
ing success rate oscillates around 50%. As before, the number of objects served by the 
freeloader quickly dictates the number of objects the freeloader is allowed to consume. 
Finally, this experiment considers a strategy that alternates between obedience and 
freeloading, changing behaviors every 20 time units. Figure 5.14 shows that the success 
ratio quickly tends toward 1 and 0 whenever these nodes switch to cooperation and to 
freeloading, respectively, with the peak success ratio dropping over time. Also, during the 
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Figure 5.14: Success rate and number of objects served and fetched with freeloaders that switch 
between cooperation and freeloading every 20 time units. 
cooperation periods, the former freeloaders service more requests, effectively making up 
for the debts they previously accumulated. On average, this alternation strategy performs 
worse, from the freeloader's perspective, than the previous 50% service strategy. 
Other experiments. In this simulation, a node requests 50 objects per time unit. If each 
object is 64 Kbytes, this translates into roughly 3MB of data per time unit — about the size 
of a typical MP3 file or digital photograph. If users attempt to download 100MB of data 
per day, their success rate would drop to zero in about an hour. Increasing the download 
rate does not help, since its merely accelerates the decline in success rate. 
To test Scrivener's sensitivity to the size of the downloaded content, the next experi-
ment divides large objects into smaller chunks that were stored and downloaded separately. 
The success rate of obedient nodes improved relative to the earlier experiments. When 
downloading smaller chunks, smaller credits were necessary, increasing the success rate of 
transitive trading. Also of note, freeloaders experienced an even lower success rate. Be-
cause a desired object may now be spread over several chunks, the odds of successfully 
84 
obtaining all of a file's chunks diminished. Of course, breaking a file into chunks will 
increase the overhead rate, as each chunk will need to be separately located and fetched. 
Simulations are also carried out where obedient nodes have diverse bandwidth capaci-
ties. The success rate for both types of nodes are very close to 100%, although the success 
rate for high-end nodes drops slightly. This shows that Scrivener can accommodate mod-
est imbalances in the demands and "earning potentials" of participating nodes gracefully. 
Other approaches, including treating a high-end node as several virtual nodes, may also be 
applicable. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter evaluates mechanisms to make bandwidth-limited peer-to-peer content 
distribution networks robust against freeloaders. Obedient nodes experience modest addi-
tional overhead, and over a variety of freeloading behaviors, freeloaders achieve only the 
level of service that they are willing to provide to others in the network, even for large num-
bers of freeloaders in the system. The simulations demonstrate that the obedient strategy 
maximizes a node's service received. 
5.8 Related Work 
SLIC [SGM04] considered the query nature of unstructured peer-to-peer systems like 
Gnutella [Gnu]. It proposed giving nodes service levels proportional to their contribu-
tion, so as to provide nodes incentives to share more data and handle more traffic. BitTor-
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rent [Coh03] facilitates large numbers of nodes all trying to acquire exactly the same file, 
with an emphasis on very large files (e.g., software distributions, digital movies, and so 
forth). Every BitTorrent node will have acquired some subset of the file and will trade 
blocks with other nodes until it has the whole file. In order to bootstrap new nodes, 
nodes reserve one-fourth of their bandwidth for altruistic service. Nodes that fairly trade 
their bandwidth will experience a higher quality of service. Anagnostakis and Green-
wald [AG04] suggested that performance can be improved if exchanges are extended to al-
low multiple parties involvement. Scrivener solves the more general problem, where nodes 
are interested in more diversified contents of potentially much smaller sizes. Scrivener al-
lows nodes to acquire credits from the files they serve to obtain any other files they desire in 
the future. Thus, they have an incentive to serve, even when they themselves do not require 
any content at the moment. 
GNUNET [Gro03] used the idea of locally-maintained debit/credit relations in a similar 
fashion to Scrivener. It also used debt relationships across nodes, comparable to the debt-
based routing. As GNUNET is more concerned with anonymity than network efficiency, it 
does not support transmitting objects directly across the network. All traffic goes through 
the overlay, forcing intermediate nodes to carry the bulk traffic of the object transfer while 
giving them no particular incentive to do this, save for maintaining their own anonymity. 
For a path with N nodes, GNUNET transfers the object 0(N) times. Scrivener, on the 
other hand, finds efficient routes and transmits bulk data directly over the Internet, yielding 
higher performance, but lacking GNUNET'S anonymity features. Scrivener also provides 
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mechanism to locate and fetch objects, leveraging its existing credit/debit framework. 
This chapter is particularly relevant to Axelrod's study [Axe81] on cooperations emerged 
under selfish individual users' interaction. Under certain assumptions, if everyone is using 
the reciprocal cooperative strategy of tit-for-tat, no strategy can do any better than the pop-
ulation average. Moreover, his study discusses how cooperation can emerge from a small 
cluster of discriminating individuals even when everyone else is using a strategy of uncon-
ditional defection. This explains why our proposed system can converge even when most 
users may be selfish and not fully cooperative. 
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Chapter 6 
Anonymous Communication Systems 
Distributed anonymous communication networks depend on volunteers to donate re-
sources to relay traffic. In the case of Tor [DMS04], one of the most popular and widely 
used anonymity systems, the efforts of volunteers have not grown as fast as the demands on 
Tor. This increasingly disparity is limiting the system's performance. This chapter explores 
techniques to incentivize Tor users to establish Tor relays through measuring performance 
of Tor relays by the central directory authorities. 
Design objective: Users that provide more relay bandwidth should receive better 
service in return, both in terms of anonymity and performance. 
This work was in collaboration with Roger Dingledine and Dan S. Wallach. 
6.1 Introduction 
Anonymizing networks such as Tor [DMS04] and Mixminion [DDM03] aim to provide 
protection from traffic analysis on the Internet. Traffic analysis focuses on who is commu-
nicating with whom, which users are using which websites, and so on. These networks 
work by bouncing traffic around a network of relays operated around the world, and strong 
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security comes from having a large and diverse network. To this end, Tor has built a com-
munity of volunteer relay operators. It suffers if too few people choose to operate relays to 
support the network's traffic. 
In fact, Tor is heading in exactly this direction. The number of users keeps growing, 
while a variety of factors discourage more people from setting up relays; some want to save 
their bandwidth for their own use, some cannot be bothered to configure port forwarding 
on their firewall, and some worry about the possible consequences from running a relay. 
This growing user-to-relay ratio in turn hurts the service received by all users. 
Worse, not all users are equal; while Tor was designed for web browsing, instant mes-
saging, and other low-bandwidth communication, an increasing number of Internet users 
are looking for ways to anonymize high-volume communications. An informal measure-
ment study, performed by running a Tor exit relay, found that the median connection com-
ing out of the relay looked like HTTP traffic, but the median byte distribution looked like 
file-sharing traffic. 
This issue is worsening over time. Because of the threat of legal action from the enter-
tainment industry, some users of peer-to-peer file-sharing applications are starting to tunnel 
their traffic through Tor. The Azureus BitTorrent client, one of the most popular BitTor-
rent clients, has built-in support for using Tor. Even though the default Tor exit policy 
rejects the default BitTorrent ports, enough users are using non-standard ports for their file-
sharing that this additional load on an already overloaded network makes the service bad 
for all users. 
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The most straightforward way to attract more people to run relays is to provide them 
with better service. Tor users care and value privacy and anonymity, and better anonymity 
means better service. Anonymity aside, most users would prefer a faster network, so per-
formance (available bandwidth) is another important metric for service evaluation. 
This chapter proposes a solution for Tor where the central directory authorities measure 
the performance of individual relays and use this information to decide the level of service 
one can get. This is made possible by constructing multiple disjoint Tor networks and by 
differentiated traffic treatment. Through simulation, this design is shown to improve the 
service for cooperative relays, even as traffic from other users increases. This approach 
incentivizes end users to establish new Tor relays, improving Tor for everybody. 
6.2 Background 
The Tor network is an overlay network of volunteers running Tor relays that relay TCP 
streams for Tor clients. Tor aims to let its users connect to Internet destinations like websites 
while making it hard for (1) an attacker on the client side to learn the intended destination, 
(2) an attacker on the destination side to learn the client's location, and (3) any small group 
of relays to link the client to her destinations. 
To connect to a destination website or other service via Tor, the client software incre-
mentally creates a private pathway or circuit of encrypted connections through several Tor 
relays, negotiating a separate set of encryption keys for each hop along the circuit. The 
circuit is extended one hop at a time, and each relay along the way knows only the immedi-
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ately previous and following relay in the circuit, so no single Tor relay knows the complete 
path that each fixed-sized data packet (or cell) will take. Thus, neither an eavesdropper nor 
a compromised relay can see both the connection's source and destination. Clients period-
ically rotate to a new circuit, to complicate long-term linkability between different actions 
by a single user. 
The client learns which relays it can use by fetching a signed list of Tor relays from 
one of the directory authorities. Each authority lists the available relays along with a set of 
opinions or recommendations for each. Clients make their decisions based on the authority 
opinions. A more detailed description of the Tor design can be found in its original design 
document [DMS04] and its specifications [DM]. 
6.3 Design 
This section discusses the possible design space and our proposed solution. 
6.3.1 Design space 
Below is a list of design options we have considered. 
Measurement methods We need a way to find out which users are contributing. There 
are three ways to make measurements: 
(1) Individual measurements: If each node kept its observations strictly to itself (as with 
BitTorrent's tit-for-tat measurements), then a given relay node would only be aware of a few 
peers' current behavior. Stale or absent knowledge of remote peers' behavior might then 
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lead to incorrect decisions on whether to prioritize those nodes' traffic. It might also lead 
to partitioning attacks [DDM03]; when users are not all acting on the same information 
and being given the same treatment, an observer may be able to distinguish one user from 
others. An active attacker can even manipulate network views to induce these attacks. 
(2) Distributed measurements: This approach allows relays to report their own obser-
vations about other relays to the directory authorities. The directory authorities can for 
example use the median vote [SB08]. However, this requires relays to reveal sensitive data 
that a compromised directory authority may use to deanonymize traffic. 
(3) Central measurements: Since Tor already has globally trusted directory authorities, 
we can leverage them to actively measure the performance of each individual relay. By 
measuring through the Tor network itself, the directory authorities can hide their identity 
and intent from the Tor relays. This method of anonymously auditing nodes' behavior is 
similarly used in other systems [DS02, NWD03, SNDW06]. 
Network size The anonymity for Tor and similar systems comes from "blending into a 
crowd" [RR98]. The core idea is that an observer cannot pinpoint the origin and destination 
of traffic if it is as likely to be any one in a crowd. One way to measure the degree of 
anonymity one enjoys is fc-anonymity [Swe02], where k is the size of the crowd. The 
fc-anonymity increases with the size of the network. All other things being equal, users 
generally prefer to join a larger network. 
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Performance improvement A direct incentive for contribution is to reward good users 
with better performance. Contribution can be measured in the form of bandwidth and/or 
latency of the relayed traffic for that relay. The tricky part is to decide which users to be 
rewarded, since tracking users and keeping statistics can introduce new anonymity attacks. 
After all, anonymizing networks are specifically designed to make it hard to identify the 
origin of a connection, so any sort of accounting schemes seems to be at odds with pre-
serving anonymity. If we rely on Tor users to report their experience, they could indirectly 
reveal the circuits they used, aiding attacks on anonymity. If we ask the relays to report 
their experience, they might strategically lie about their results [ARS+08], or they might 
reveal information that could violate users' anonymity. Any use of "hearsay" evidence that 
cannot be validated is an opportunity for fraud. For example, if saying good things about a 
peer can increase its reputation, then we now have an incentive for Sybil attacks [Dou02], 
creating an army of nodes whose purpose is to speak admiringly of a given node to improve 
its reputation. 
Differentiated treatment suffers from a major drawback: It reduces the ^-anonymity of 
the users. In particular, to provide special treatment, traffic from those users needs to be 
marked differently. If only a small fraction of users is treated preferably, this would reduce 
their levels of anonymity, which contradicts to our goal of rewarding them. 
Maintaining and publishing "debts" Scrivener in Chapter 5 uses no central authorities, 
and instead relies on nodes maintaining their relative bandwidth debts and credits, which 
are then used to identify paths in the "debt space." These debt paths are an essential way to 
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overcome the otherwise limited direct relationships that may be observed between nodes. 
Publishing data like this would be devastating for anonymity as it would allow observers 
to piece together Tor's data circuits, piece by piece, by observing the bandwidth debts 
changing in synchrony from one relay node to the next. 
Pairwise relations Another option is for nodes to directly measure their peers' perfor-
mance in a fashion analogous to the tit-for-tat trading strategies used in BitTorrent [Coh03] 
or the peer auditing in Chapter 5. However, a Tor relay may have information on only a 
limited number of other relays, so any benefit from this approach may also be limited. 
Electronic cash Another alternative is an anonymous digital cash scheme where relays 
earn cash for relaying traffic from users, but there are still traffic analysis attacks when users 
go to the bank to deposit or withdraw coins (these attacks may be done by an observer or 
also by a colluding bank). There would also be a need for a secondary protocol for resolving 
disputes when one side fails to hold up its end of the bargain. 
Leverage social network A final method is to leverage social networks' trust relation-
ships, which have been used in a variety of past peer-to-peer systems to improve robustness 
(see, e.g., SPROUT [MGGM04] and SybilGuard [YKGF06]). Unfortunately, if any repu-
tation system included a mechanism for relays to determine that they are friends with the 
originator of the circuit, those mechanisms could be leveraged to attack users' anonymity. 
Using reputation systems without compromising anonymity may be possible, but it would 
be difficult to do properly. 
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6.3.2 The proposed design 
Out of the aforementioned design choices, the most effective one is to ensure contribut-
ing users to have better anonymity by assigning them to larger networks. As a complement 
solution, we can also improve their performance, but this must be done carefully so as to 
not reduce their anonymity. The rest of this section describes our design. 
We employ central measurements on the network, i.e., we use central directory authori-
ties to perform measurements on each individual relays. This gives us an idea on how much 
bandwidth each relay is contributing to the system. These results are then used to decide 
the level of service received by each relay, through running a premium version of Tor and 
assigning gold stars. 
Part I: Premium Tor 
First, we improve the ^-anonymity of contributing users by allowing them to join a 
larger network. The Tor administrators can create two disjoint Tor networks, one is called 
premium Tor, and the other one called probational Tor. All new users first join the proba-
tional Tor. Relays with acceptable performance would receive signed permission from the 
central authorities, which would allow them to join the premium Tor. Users in premium 
Tor must still provide satisfactory level of service to stay. 
To guarantee that the users in the premium Tor have better anonymity than their coun-
terparts in the probational Tor, the performance threshold must be set to be reasonably low. 
This means we probably need to promote all users who are running relays at a minimal 
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bandwidth. 
With this setting, most users, except the few freeloaders, would be able to join the 
premium Tor. The premium Tor should be comparatively larger in size, thus providing a 
better ^-anonymity. If there are still too many relays with unacceptable performance, the 
directory authorities can also break the probational Tor into several smaller ones, in a sense 
to punish those in the probational Tor with artificially poorer anonymity. 
Note that because the premium Tor consists of mostly cooperative relays and no freeload-
ers, the performance of its relays should naturally be better already. This would also en-
courage most users to run relays, just so that they can join the premium Tor and enjoy the 
better anonymity and service. If performance remains as a concern, the directory authori-
ties can opt to enable the second part of the design: Assigning gold stars. 
Part II: Assigning gold stars 
The second part attempts to further improve the performance for the more cooperative 
users through priority treatment to their connections, thus providing an incentive for users 
to run faster relays. Note that to provide proper treatment for traffic from different relays, 
an intermediate relay does not need to know the identity of the origin; in fact, it suffices 
for the relay to only know the priority of the cell. The problem now reduces to how the 
intermediate relay can reliably obtain this information. If it relies on the predecessor relay, 
a selfish relay could always claim its own traffic as high priority and enjoy the benefit. 
The proposed solution for this problem is to give "gold star" status to relays that provide 
good service to others. A gold star relay's traffic is given high priority by other relays, i.e., 
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they always get relayed ahead of other traffic. Furthermore, when a gold star relay receives 
a high priority connection from another gold star relay, it passes on the gold star status so 
the connection remains high priority on the next hop. All other traffic gets low priority. If 
a low priority node relays data through a gold star relay, the traffic is relayed but at low 
priority. Traffic priority is circuit-based. Once a circuit is created, its priority remains the 
same during its entire lifetime. 
Due to variations of the network conditions and the multi-hop nature of Tor, it may 
take multiple measurements to get accurate results. Therefore, a "k out of n" approach 
is used, where a relay has to have satisfactory performance for k times out of the last n 
measurements to be eligible for gold star status. At this point, it becomes a policy issue of 
who gets a gold star. For example, one could assign a gold star to the fastest 7/8 of the 
nodes, following the current Tor design in which the slowest one-eighth of Tor relays are 
not used to relay traffic at all. The directory authorities can then distribute the gold star 
status labels with the relay information they presently distribute. 
In this way, no only do users with slower relays receive worse performance, they also 
have less anonymity, since there are only a smaller fraction of them sending traffic without 
the gold star. 
Design properties 
As measurements are performed centrally, peers need not have any trust in one another. 
Likewise, the system will respond quickly when the central authority publishes a finding. 
Best of all, none of the published information would compromise the anonymity of other 
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Tor traffic. The only information ever measured or published is whether a given node 
passed an audit for properly relaying its traffic. 
The effectiveness of this approach depends on the accuracy of the measurements, which 
in turn depends on the measurement frequency. Frequent measurements increase confi-
dence, but they also place an increasing burden on the overlay network and limit the scala-
bility of the measuring nodes. 
6.4 Experiments 
This section shows simulation results of Tor networks under different scenarios. The 
goal is to evaluate the effectiveness of the two measurement schemes against a variety of 
different scenarios, including varying amounts of load on the Tor network, and varying 
strategies taken by simulated nodes (e.g., selfish vs. cooperative). 
6.4.1 Experimental apparatus 
We built a packet-level discrete event simulator that models a Tor overlay network. The 
simulator, written in Java, was executed on 64-bit AMD Opteron 252 dual-core servers 
with 4GB of RAM and running RedHat Enterprise Linux (kernel version 2.6.9) and Sun's 
JVM, version 1.5.0. 
The simulator simulates every cell at every hop. Each node, particularly simulated 
BitTorrent clients, can easily have hundreds of outstanding cells in the network at any 
particular time. Unsurprisingly, the simulations are slow and memory-intensive. In fact, 
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in some larger scale simulations, the simulated time is slower than the wall clock time. 
Likewise, memory usage is remarkable. Simulating 20 BitTorrent clients and 2000 web 
clients consumes most of the available memory. To keep the client-to-relay ratio realistic, 
we limit the simulations to Tor networks with around 150 relays. 
For simplicity, we assume that the upstream and downstream bandwidth for all relays 
is symmetric, since the forwarding rate of any relay with asymmetric bandwidth will be 
limited by its lower upstream throughput. We also assume relays take no processing time. 
The cooperative relays (which reflect the altruists in the current Tor network) have a band-
width of 500KB/s. We assume the latency between any two nodes in the network is fixed 
at 100 ms. 
The simulations use different numbers of simplified web and BitTorrent clients to gen-
erate background traffic. The web traffic is based on Hernandez-Campos et al. [HCJS03]'s 
"Data Set 4," collected in April 2003 [The]. The simplified BitTorrent clients always main-
tain four connections and will upload and download data at the maximum speed Tor allows. 
They also periodically replace their slowest connection with a new one, much like the real 
BitTorrent seeks to maximize the download rate from its available connections. We assume 
that the external web or BitTorrent servers have unlimited bandwidth. The different relay 
traffic types are: 
Cooperative. These nodes will use their entire 500KB/s bandwidth to satisfy the needs of 
their peers, and will give priority to "gold star" traffic when present. (If sufficient 
gold star traffic is available to fill the entire pipe, regular traffic will be completely 
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starved for service.) 
Selfish. These nodes never relay traffic for others. They are freeloaders on the Tor system 
with 500KB/s of bandwidth. 
Cooperative slow. These nodes follow the same policy as cooperative nodes, but with only 
50KB/S of bandwidth. 
Cooperative reserve. These nodes have 500KB/s bandwidth, just like cooperative nodes, 
but cap their relaying at 50KB/s, unless they are currently using a connection for 
their own traffic, in which case they do not cap that connection. 
Adaptive. These nodes will behave just like cooperative nodes until they get a gold star. 
After this, they will change to the selfish policy until they lose the gold star. 
All of the simulations use ten directory authorities. Every minute each directory au-
thority will randomly build a circuit with three Tor relays and measure its bandwidth by 
downloading a small 40KB file from an external server. The bandwidth measurement is 
recorded and attributed to only the middle relay in the circuit. To obtain a gold star, we 
required Tor relays to successfully relay traffic at least two times out of the last five mea-
surements (i.e., k = 2 and n = 5 in Section 6.3.2). 
When reporting the simulation results, the observed network performance will be de-
scribed in terms of "download time" and "ping time." The former describes the necessary 
time for each node to download a 100KB file from an external server. The latter describes 
the roundtrip latency for that same external server. (For the simulations, this external server 
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Figure 6.1: Average download and ping time over time when no incentive scheme is in place and 
heavy traffic (20 BitTorrent clients and 2000 web clients). Both download and ping time show 
significant variation, regardless of relay type. 
is assumed to have infinite bandwidth and introduce zero latency of its own.) Both mea-
sures are important indicators of how a Tor user might perceive the quality of the experience 
when web surfing. For contrast, a Tor user running file-sharing software or downloading 
large files will be largely insensitive to latency. 
6.4.2 Experiment 1: Unincentivized Tor 
The first experiment is to understand how Tor networks behave when demand for the 
network's resources exceeds its supply. This experiment simulates 50 cooperative relays, 
50 selfish relays, and 50 cooperative reserve relays, with heavy background traffic (20 
BitTorrent clients and 2000 web clients). 
Figure 6.1 plots the average download and ping time for each relay type. Even after 
averaging for 50 relays, the data points are still highly fluctuating, suggesting that the net-
work performance is variable (and appears to be a long-tailed distribution). This is largely 
due to the BitTorrent traffic, as it sometimes dominates the available bandwidth, starving 
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Figure 6.2: Cumulative download and ping time when no incentive scheme is in place and heavy 
traffic (20 BitTorrent clients and 2000 web clients). Performance for all relay types is similar, 
although selfish relays do somewhat better in the worst case. 
other circuits sharing the same relays for bandwidth. 
To get a better view of the distribution of download times and ping times, cumulative 
distribution functions (CDFs) are used. Figure 6.2 represents the same data as Figure 6.1, 
albeit without any of the averaging. The x-axis represents download time or ping time and 
the y-axis represents the percentage of nodes who experienced that particular download or 
ping time or less. 
While the ideal download time for all relay types in this experiment is 0.8 second (six 
network roundtrip hops plus bandwidth time), all relay types rarely achieve anywhere close 
to this number. Figure 6.2 clearly shows that roughly 80% of the attempted downloads take 
more than two seconds, regardless of a node's policy. Cooperative relays have approxi-
mately 10% of attempted downloads taking longer than ten seconds. Less than 5% of the 
selfish nodes see such poor performance. Selfish nodes, in general, do better in the worst 
case than cooperative nodes, but observe similar common-case performance. 
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Figure 6.3: The average scores measured for different relays, with no background traffic (upper 
left), light background traffic (upper right), and heavy background traffic (bottom). 
6.4.3 Experiment 2: Score measurements 
This set of experiments verifies the feasibility to measure the performance accurately 
in a probational Tor network for promoting cooperative relays to the premium network, as 
described in Section 6.3.2. 
The first experiment shows 40 of each of four types of relays (cooperative, cooperative 
reserve, cooperative slow, and selfish) under no background traffic, light background traffic 
(10 BitTorrent clients and 1000 web clients), and heavy background traffic (20 BitTorrent 
clients and 2000 web clients). Each directory server periodically measures the download 
time and gives a score to the middle relay relative to an "ideal" time. Figure 6.3 shows the 
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results over time. 
First, observe that in all cases, the average score for selfish relays drops to zero very 
quickly, because they never relay traffic. On the opposite, cooperative relays attains and 
remains at a relatively high score, although less smoothly with increased background traffic. 
The scores for cooperative reserve and cooperative slow relays are very similar. This shows 
that a simple measurement can provide a coarse partition of cooperative relays from selfish 
ones, and this is sufficient for promoting more or less cooperative relays to a premium 
network. 
Alternating relays 
The second experiment investigates on how reactive the measurements are to relays' 
changing behavior. This experiment has 50 of each of three types of relays (cooperative, 
alternating, and selfish). Alternating relays change their behavior every two hours, between 
fully cooperative and fully selfish. Figure 6.4 shows the results over time. 
From the figures, the score patterns for cooperative and selfish relays are similar to be-
fore. For alternating relays, their scores quickly approached to that of the cooperative or 
selfish relays, depending on which mode they are in. This shows that the measurement 
scheme is not only accurate, but it is also dynamic enough to find out the recent perfor-
mance of the relays. Therefore, it is a very effective way to track relay performance for 
assigning them to a proper Tor network. 
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Figure 6.4: The average scores measured when there are alternating relays, with no background 
traffic (upper left), light background traffic (upper right), and heavy background traffic (bottom). 
6.4.4 Experiment 3: Gold stars 
This experiment set measures the effectiveness of the gold star mechanism described 
in Section 6.3.2. The simulation consists of 40 cooperative relays, 40 selfish relays, 40 
cooperative slow relays, and 40 adaptive relays. These variations show whether slower 
cooperative nodes still get the benefits of a gold star, and whether adaptive nodes can be 
more effective than purely selfish nodes. Figures 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 show the cumulative 
download and ping time with no background traffic, light background traffic, and heavy 
background traffic, respectively. 
The results are striking. Cooperative nodes maintain their performance, regardless of 
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the level of background traffic in the overlay. When there is no background traffic, they 
slightly outperform the selfish and adaptive nodes, but once the traffic grows, the cooper-
ative nodes see clear improvements in download time and in latency. For example, under 
heavy background traffic, 80% of the cooperative nodes see download times under two 
seconds, versus roughly 2.5 seconds for the selfish and adaptive nodes. 
This experiment shows that the adaptive scheme is ineffective at defeating the gold star 
mechanism. Adaptive nodes will experience better performance while they have a gold 
star, but their benefit only splits the difference between the cooperative and selfish policies, 
roughly in proportion to the additional effort they are spending to maintain their gold star. 
Cooperative slow nodes, like their fast counterparts, experience stable performance as 
the background load on the Tor network increases. This demonstrates that the gold star 
policy can effectively reward good behavior, regardless of a node's available bandwidth. 
A further experiment replaces the cooperative slow nodes with cooperative reserve 
nodes, representing a possibly rational response to the gold star mechanism. As a node 
only needs to prove that it is relaying data in order to get the gold star, it might benefit by 
reserving most of its bandwidth for its own needs, here using only 10% of its bandwidth 
for its contributions to the good of other nodes. Figures 6.8-6.10 show the results of this 
experiment. 
In each condition, both kinds of cooperative nodes observe identical distributions of 
bandwidth and latency. Again, selfish and adaptive nodes suffer as the background traffic 
increases. This experiment shows, unsurprisingly, that nodes need not be "fully" cooper-
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ative to gain a gold star. In an actual Tor deployment, it would become a policy matter, 
perhaps an adaptive process based on measuring the Tor network, to determine a suitable 
cutoff for granting gold stars (see Section 6.5.1 for more discussion on handling strategic 
behaviors in Tor). 
Alternating relays 
This experiment considers a variation on the adaptive strategy, used previously. Al-
ternating nodes will toggle between the cooperative and the selfish strategies on a longer 
timescale — four hours per switch. This experiment uses 50 such alternating relays with 
50 cooperative relays and with heavy background traffic (20 BitTorrent clients and 2000 
web clients). 
Figure 6.11 shows the average download and ping time for both relay types over time. 
During the periods where the alternating relays are cooperative, they receive service of a 
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shown, as the latter two behave similarly to cooperative relays. 
similar quality as the full-time cooperative nodes. However, once the alternating relays 
switch to become selfish, their download times quickly increase, representing the same 
quality of service that would be observed by a selfish node. Of interest, while the coopera-
tive nodes do observe lower quality of service (after all, fully half of the Tor nodes stopped 
relaying any data), they still do much better than their selfish peers. 
This experiment further demonstrates the system robustly responding to changes in 
node behavior. 
6.4.5 Experiment 4: Pair-wise reputation 
This final experiment investigates a variation on the gold star design, where individual 
circuits are not labeled as being low or high priority. In this variation, a low-priority node 
routing traffic through a gold-star node will experience priority delays getting the gold star 
node to accept the traffic, but the traffic will have the gold star priority in its subsequent 
hops. This alternative design has significant improvements from an anonymity perspective, 
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because traffic at a given hop does not give any hint about whether it originated from a 
low-priority or high-priority node. However, this design might fail from an incentives 
perspective, since there is less incentive for a node to earn its own gold star. 
This experiment again simulates a network with 40 relays for each relay type: coop-
erative, selfish, cooperative reserve, and adaptive. For clarity, Figure 6.12 only shows the 
download and ping time for cooperative and selfish relays, as the performances for cooper-
ative reserve and adaptive relays are very close to those for cooperative relays. 
This experiment shows selfish nodes clearly outperforming their cooperative peers. 
This indicates that the gold star strategy requires a transitive property, i.e., each hop of 
a circuit must inherit the gold star status of the previous hop. Otherwise, selfish nodes will 
outperform their cooperative peers and there will be no incentive for cooperation. 
6.5 Discussion 
6.5.1 Strategic users 
The proposed incentive scheme is not perfectly strategy-proof, in the sense that users 
can earn a gold star without providing all of their network capacity for the use of the Tor 
network. This creates a variety of possible strategic behavior. 
Provide borderline or spotty service. A relay needs to provide only the minimal amount 
of bandwidth necessary to gain the gold star. Of course, if every user provided this amount, 
Tor would still have vastly greater resources than it does today. Next, because the band-
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width policies are determined centrally, the minimum bandwidth necessary to obtain a gold 
star could be moved up or down manually. Strategic nodes will then adjust the capacity they 
give to the Tor network, making more bandwidth available whenever they are needed. 
Only relay at strategic times. Such users might provide relay services only when the 
"local" user is away, and thus not making demands on the Tor network. Such behavior 
is not disincentivized by this research, as it still provides scalable resources to the Tor 
network. However, any users following such behavior may be partially compromising their 
anonymity, as their presence or absence will be externally observable. 
Forward high-priority traffic as low-priority. A relay who correctly forwards traffic 
can still cheat by changing the priority on incoming traffic. The measuring authorities 
should build high priority test circuits back to a trusted relay, to see if the circuit arrives 
with the expected high priority status. 
6.5.2 The audit arms race 
Some attacks outlined above involve relays that provide some level of service but not 
quite as much as expected. The response in each case is a smarter or more intensive mea-
surement algorithm so the directory authorities can more precisely distinguish uncoopera-
tive behavior. 
To see why this would not be an arms race between increasingly subtle cheating and 
increasingly sophisticated audits, consider the incentives for ordinary users. The most chal-
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lenging part of setting up a Tor relay is configuring the software, enabling port forwarding 
in the firewall, etc. Compared to this initial barrier, the incremental cost of providing a bit 
more bandwidth is low for most users. As long as the audit mechanism correctly judges 
whether the user relays any traffic at all, it is verifying that the user has performed the most 
costly step in setting up relaying. The diminishing returns a strategic relay gets in saving 
bandwidth as the arms race progresses will limit the complexity required for the auditing 
mechanism. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter proposes an incentive scheme to reward Tor users who relay traffic. Simu-
lations show that users who cooperate with the desired policies can be identified, and they 
can achieve sizable performance improvements, while at the same time also enjoy a better 
fc-anonymity. This creates significant incentives for many users to join the Tor network as 
relays, further improving the system in both aspects. 
There are some areas for further research, such as how to reward relays without sep-
arating anonymity sets, how to scale up the audits to work on a larger Tor network, what 
thresholds should merit a gold star, and whether simulations are needed to reflect a more 
realistic mix of users (e.g., more slow relays and/or relays with asymmetric bandwidth). 
Once these issues have been investigated, they should be integrated to the design for an 
upcoming Tor release and test how well it works in real network conditions. 
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6.7 Related Work 
Real-world anonymizing networks have operated on three incentive approaches: Com-
munity support, payment for service, and government support. (Discussion of the funding 
approaches for research and development of anonymity designs, while related, is outside 
the scope of this thesis.) The Tor network right now is built on community support: A 
group of volunteers from around the Internet donate their resources because they want the 
network to exist. 
Zero-Knowledge Systems' Freedom network [BSGOO] on the other hand was a com-
mercial anonymity service. They collected money from their users, and paid commercial 
ISPs to relay traffic. While that particular company failed to make its business model work, 
the more modest Anonymizer [Ano] successfully operates a commercial one-hop proxy 
based on a similar approach. 
Lastly, the AN.ON project's cascade-based network is directly funded by the German 
government as part of a research project. Unfortunately, the funding ended in 2007, so they 
are exploring the community support approach (several of their nodes are now operated 
by other universities) and the pay-for-play approach (setting up commercial cascades that 
provide more reliable service). 
Other incentive approaches have been discussed as well. Acquisti et al. [ADS03] argued 
that high-needs users (people who place a high value on their anonymity) will opt to relay 
traffic in order to attract low-needs users — and that some level of free riding is actually 
beneficial because it provides cover traffic to blend with. This is unclear how well that 
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argument transitions from high-latency systems analyzed to low-latency ones, especially 
since the different threat models change the incentive structure. 
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Chapter 7 
Design Discussions 
This thesis addresses the incentive problem in peer-to-peer systems with designs that 
vary based on application type. This is necessary because users' incentive is inherently dif-
ferent under different applications, and the best solution depends on the specific properties 
of the particular application type. To better understand the constraints and characteristics 
of different mechanisms, this chapter provides a summary of the mechanism types and 
discusses when and how they are useful. 
7.1 Pairwise Exchanges 
Tit-for-tat. Despite being the simplest and most straightforward mechanism, tit-for-tat 
rarely works except for a limited set of applications. The underlying reason is that tit-
for-tat requires two parties to have available resources and be interested in each other's 
resources at the same time. Although it is typical for BitTorrent nodes to exchange content 
with each other, as well as nodes in backup applications to exchange storage space with 
each other, this prerequisite is generally hard to realize when users have diverse interest, 
say for general content distribution systems. It also becomes increasingly harder to find 
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exchange partners as the network size and resource diversification increase. Moreover, 
users cease to have incentives to provide resources when they do not have any immediate 
demand, and this limits the networks from achieving their full potential. 
Electronic currencies. The use of electronic currencies is a natural extension over tit-for-
tat, as it enables the division of "buying" and "selling" of service into separate transactions 
and allows peers to transact with different partners. Additionally, it encourages users to 
contribute resources even at times when they do not need anything in return, as currencies 
can be saved for later use. 
However, without a working reputation system already in place, currencies issued by 
individuals do not have much perceived value. Otherwise, currencies need to be issued and 
controlled by some trusted authority, but such an authority may not be available or feasible 
in peer-to-peer systems. It is also relatively expensive to implement, since any transaction 
would either require cryptographic operations or has to be overseen by a trusted accounting 
party. Whenever there is a dispute over a transaction, it is usually difficult for the trusted 
party to decide which side is to blame. As a result, electronic currency is hard to define 
properly and difficult to deploy. 
7.2 Reputation 
Instead of relying individual nodes themselves to track the pairwise history with all 
the peers they have interacted, it is more efficient and effective to have a global notion 
of reputation of each node based on how it has interacted with all peers in the past. If 
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reputation is available, nodes can always make an informed decision on which of its peers 
to provide service to, even if they have not received service from those peers before. Nodes 
with poor reputation would find it difficult to receive any service from the system. 
There are problems associated with reputation systems. For centralized reputation sys-
tems, there needs to be a trusted central authority to compute reputation, creating a problem 
similar to that with electronic currencies. If it is distributed, it is difficult to ensure its cor-
rectness and accuracy, particularly in the presence of collusion. Regardless, if reputation is 
computed based on peers' reported opinion, it would create an incentive for Sybil attacks. 
The design for anonymous communication networks in Chapter 6 is somewhat similar 
to a reputation system. It is feasible only because it leverages the existing trusted authority 
in directory servers, and reputation is computed based on anonymous measurement per-
formed by those trusted directory servers. 
7.3 General Primitives 
Ideally, if there were a general primitive that could deter freeloading, it would then be 
possible to apply across different applications and solve all incentive problems. An attempt 
towards this goal is the BAR model [AAC+05], which ensures the replicated state machine 
protocols it uses are incentive-compatible. However, this approach is quite expensive, be-
cause it relies on a multi-party agreement protocol for each decision. In addition, collusion 
posts a real challenge, as colluding peers could help each other to cover their misbehavior. 
PeerReview [HKD07] employs a more practical approach. It ensures that Byzantine 
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faults observed by correct nodes are eventually detected and irrefutably linked to the faulty 
node. Since it is based on leaving evidence, there could be a time lag before misbehavior 
is discovered. If quick detection of misbehavior is important, PeerReview would require 
frequent audits, which would also become expensive. In these scenarios, a custom solution 
can usually be faster and more efficient. 
Furthermore, some applications may have certain properties that cannot coexist with 
these primitives. For example, neither primitive is particularly suitable for anonymous 
communication networks discussed in Chapter 6 as both would generate traces to assist an 
adversary to deanonymize traffic. 
It is also interesting to note that both schemes choose a punishment approach, where 
unknown peers are assumed cooperative and are punished only after they have deviated 
from expected behavior. As to be discussed in next section, this approach may not be very 
effective for untrusted peer-to-peer systems. 
7.4 Other Design Choices 
Punishment vs. rewarding. Traditional system prefers a "punishment" approach, where 
nodes are initially assumed to be cooperative, but misbehavior would be detected and mis-
behaving nodes punished. This design mindset is in general not suitable for peer-to-peer 
systems, since the majority of nodes may not be altruistically cooperative. Also, unless a 
perfect solution against Sybil attack exists, if the cost for a node to leave and rejoin the 
system is lower than that of the punishment, nodes will simply decide to leave, rendering 
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the threat of punishment toothless. 
Thus, for the punishment approach to work, the cost of rejoining has to be so high that 
nodes would prefer not to jeopardize their status. Out of all applications considered, the 
only suitable case is archival storage systems, because when a node is expelled from the 
network, all the content it has stored on the network would be lost, and rejoining would 
mean re-uploading all their data. 
Direct vs. indirect experience. Another design choice is whether nodes rely solely on its 
direct experience to evaluate its peers, or also rely on its peers' experience. The former case 
limits what and how fast a node can learn about its peers, and every node has to individually 
learn the same facts. However, first-hand observation is also more reliable. The design for 
streaming applications in Chapter 4 can rely on only direct experience since there is a 
large number of interactions between nodes, and the number is further increased through 
tree reconstructions. On the other hand, it does not work for anonymous communication 
networks due to the limited number of interactions with different nodes. In fact, to preserve 
anonymity, Tor explicitly discourages nodes from interacting with too many peers. This 
makes direct experience extremely limited. 
7.5 Common Design Principles 
After studying a number of different applications in this dissertation, this section sum-
marizes several design principles that can be applied to a variety of peer-to-peer systems. 
These principles are aimed for very large scale systems in an untrusted and ungoverned 
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environment, for example an open peer-to-peer network on the Internet. 
Principle 1: Understand users' interests. First and foremost, system designers must have 
a throughout understanding of users' incentives. In Economics terms, they must be 
able to accurately model the users' utility functions. This is necessary because these 
systems must be able to reward desirable behavior and punish undesirable ones, thus 
creating the foundation for cooperation. 
Principle 2: Decentralized design. Peer-to-peer systems are meant to scale. Any central-
ized component can easily become a bottleneck or a single point of failure and disrupt 
the service. Thus, to maintain high availability, these systems must be designed in a 
mostly distributed fashion. In particular, peers should be able to make all decisions 
locally, without constantly consulting centralized parties like a bank or a reputation 
server. 
Principle 3: Limited credits to strangers. In an open peer-to-peer system, the cost for 
one to leave and rejoin is typically very low. Yet users usually interact with a large 
number of peers, many of whom they have no prior knowledge with. On one hand, if 
all users refuse to service strangers at all, the whole system cannot bootstrap; on the 
other hand, if they blindly provide good services to any stranger, there will be little 
incentive for selfish users to contribute. As a result, the design philosophy should 
be reward-based instead of punishment-based, and users should give some limited 
credits, but not too much lenience, to strangers. 
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Principle 4: Use only trustworthy information. Users can obtain information about their 
peers through either their personal experience or third-parties. In a world where ser-
vices are valuable, it is conceivable that users may lie or even collude if that could 
improve their services. This means most third-party information is unreliable. Thus, 
users should avoid using third-party information, unless it is from a known, reliable 
source, for example a trusted authority or friends. 
Principle 5: Simple and intuitive policies. One of the aims for designing fair policies is 
so that self-interested users would follow them to maximize their own benefits. If 
users cannot understand what they need to do to receive better service, or if they do 
not agree with the policies, they may not behave in accordance with what is intended 
by the system designers, or may even leave the network. Thus, it is equally important 
to have the policies clearly communicated to users and for the policies to have a 
perceived fairness. 
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Chapter 8 
Future Work 
This thesis covers only four common peer-to-peer applications. An obvious future work 
is to apply the same design principles to other applications, for example Voice over IP 
(VoIP), non-streaming publish/subscribe networks, gaming framework, etc. 
Under the proposed designs, simulation results show that freeloaders can only receive 
partial service, if any, and the extent depends on how much resources they are contributing 
to the system. However, it is not entirely clear in practice how selfish agents would react 
to these systems. Would the reduced service still be attractive to them? Or would they 
choose to leave the system for good instead? Questions like these can be answered by 
modeling the utility function of selfish peers with their level of resource contribution. As 
a simplified example, let c(r) and b(r) be the cost and benefit of a peer when it chooses to 
contribute resource r. Then the utility function u(r) would be b(r) — c(r). A rational agent 
would adjust r to maximize u(r). Ideally, u(r) should monotonically increase with r, so 
that agents would be inclined to provide as much resources as they could. 
The designs in this thesis assume that users are unrelated and do not initially trust each 
other. As a result, the system as a whole pays the cost for suspecting strangers [DFM01, 
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FR01]. A recent research direction is to incorporate social networks into peer-to-peer 
systems [MGGM04, PGW+06]. For instance, in general content distribution networks 
discussed in Chapter 5, friends could give each other high initial confidence or even un-
bounded debt threshold. An interesting research question is how social networks can 
be integrated into incentive mechanisms, and how much additional improvement can be 
achieved. 
Mobile ad hoc networks face a similar incentive problem, since nodes in those networks 
rely on each other to forward traffic. Numerous schemes have been proposed to provide 
incentive in routing [BL02, MGLBOO, MRWZ05, SBHJ06]. In general, incentivizing mo-
bile ad hoc networks may be more difficult than peer-to-peer networks due to the limited 
computational resources and peer connectivity in mobile nodes. It would be interesting to 
see how much of the incentive schemes for peer-to-peer networks can be applied to mobile 
ad hoc networks. 
8.1 Conclusions 
My research makes the following contributions. 
• Identification of selfishness in peer-to-peer systems as a fundamentally separate and 
independent problem to the conventional adversarial attack model. 
• A proposal of a general approach to designing incentive into peer-to-peer systems. 
• Application of the proposed approach to four different peer-to-peer applications: 
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- An auditing scheme for peer-to-peer archival storage systems. 
- A local observation and selective servicing scheme for peer-to-peer streaming 
systems. 
- A pairwise debt and transitive trading scheme for peer-to-peer content distribu-
tion systems. 
- A centrally measured and assigned but distributedly enforced priority scheme 
for anonymous communication networks. 
• A summary of different mechanisms and a discussion of their suitability for different 
application types. 
Incentive for resource contribution is a problem faced by all open, cooperative peer-
to-peer applications. This problem is becoming more and more severe with the increasing 
number of freeloaders observed in these networks. The model and designs in this thesis 
provide peer-to-peer system designers, developers, and administrators suggestions and di-
rections to handle freeloaders in their networks, as well as an arsenal of mechanisms for 
them to implement. With freeloaders taken care of, this removes the largest stumbling 
block for peer-to-peer applications to live up to their full potential. 
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